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Articles
Stanley + Ferber = The
Constitutional Crime of At-Home
Child Pornography Possession
By JOSEPHINE R. POTUTO*
Although I am a first amendment absolutist, in the area
of children I deviate from my absolutism, which is rather
strange. It might seem like a contradiction, but bear with
me.
I am in favor of a Nazi saying that a Jew should
burn. I am in favor of a member of the Ku Klux Klan
arguing that blacks either be lynched or be sent back to Africa,
whatever. Whatever point of view that they have.
But in the area of children, they must be protected. For
the 16 years I have published Screw, even before I published
Screw, I have always felt children must be protected. So Screw
Magazine has never championed, has always been appalled by
the abuse of children. We have never condoned it, never run
photos of child abuse and frankly, I feel that anyone who sells
photos of child porn should be put away for a long, long
time.'
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.A., Douglass College, 1967; M.A.,
Seton Hall, 1971; J.D., Rutgers College, 1974.
1 Effect of Pornography on Women and Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 303-04 (1984)
(statement of Al Goldstein, publisher, Screw) [hereinafter Effect of Pornography]. Mr.
Goldstein was discussing punishment of sellers and distributors and, by necessary impli-
cation, producers of child pornography. He was not discussing the consumption of child
pornography in the home and in private, and I do not suggest that his concern for
children necessarily would continue paramount in the context of at-home viewing. I
include the quote simply as an illustration that the child pornography question makes
strange bed-fellows both in terms of the activity depicted and in terms of its troublesome
nature for the civil libertarians among us.
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INTRODUCTION
In a different time and in a different world3 a different
Umted States Supreme Court4 decided Stanley v Georgia.5 The
Court held that although obscenity6 is unprotected speech under
the first amendment, 7 the government constitutionally may not
prosecute an individual for the knowing but private possession
of obscene material in the home.
The Stanley Court appeared to rest its decision on two
grounds: a first amendment right to receive ideas whatever their
political or social value8 and a privacy right adhering to the
home that covers intellectuaP as well as other activity 10 While
Supreme Court decisions since Stanley have narrowed or clarified
2 Stanley's case was heard by the Georgia Supreme Court on February 13, 1968
and decided by that court on April 9, 1968. Stanley v. State, 161 S.E.2d 309 (Ga. 1968).
His case was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 14-15, 1969,
and decided by that Court on April 7, 1969. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3 For an appreciation of the marked difference in the kind and quantity of
pornography available at the time Stanley was decided and today, compare The Report
of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (Sept. 30, 1970) [hereinafter 1970
Pornography Report] with Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Re-
port (July 1986) [hereinafter A.G. Pornography Report]. See generally PoRNorRAiyn
AND SExuA. AGORSSION (N. Malamuth and E. Donnerstein 1984).
4 The members of the Stanley Court were Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Brennan, Black, Douglas, Fortas, Harlan, Marshall, Stewart, and White. The only
justices still sitting are Brennan, Marshall, and White.
5 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6 The current Supreme Court test for obscenity comes from Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test limits obscenity (i.e., unprotected speech) to material
that, when considered as a whole, portrays sexual activity in a "patently offensive way,"
appeals to a "prurient interest in sex," and has no "serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." Id. at 24.
For purposes of this article "obscenity" refers to material that meets the Miller
test and is either a visual depiction of adult conduct or words without depictions
descriptive of adults or chidren. "Child pornography," however, always refers ONLY
to visual depictions of children. Thus, when only words are concerned, the material is
either obscene or it is protected speech; it is never child pornography. See Ferber v.
New York, 458 U.S. 763, 764 (1982).
7 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
1 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. The Stanley right to receive ideas attaches so long as
their receipt causes no harm to others-thus illustrating the distinction between private
and public.
9 Italics are mine, as is the bias the italics represent.
,0 The line of cases recognizing a constitutional right of privacy includes Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing and education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (pro-
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its constitutional base by rejecting any general first amendment
(or privacy) protection for private use outside the home," the
Court has never questioned, but instead has reaffirmed consis-
tently, that an adult has a privacy entitlement to possess obscenity
in his home.'
2
In 1982 the United States Supreme Court decided Ferber v
New York.' 3 The issue in Ferber was child pornography; the
precise question was whether the first amendment prohibits crim-
inal prosecution for the knowing sale 4 of movies showing chil-
dren engaged in sexual 5 but not obscene 6 activity The Court
held that even though not obscene, child pornography is still
outside the protection of the first amendment because a state's
creation); Pnnce v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception for married persons); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives for
unmarried'persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptive distribution).
" "The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home.
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973). Thus, the Court has found no privacy
protection under Stanley for the private transportation of obscene materials designed
for commercial use. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
The Court also has found no privacy protection for the use of the mail to transport
obscenity whether for commercial or private use. Orito, 413 U.S. at 139; United States
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). In distinguishing between at-home and other uses of
pornography the Court explicitly rejected any notion of a constitutional "zone of
privacy" that attaches to a pornography consumer outside the home. Pans Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973).
The Court has recognized that the home may provide a higher privacy interest than
exists elsewhere and this is also true in the context of fourth amendment search and
seizure cases. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Compare Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
12 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).
" 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The members of the Ferber Court were Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, Ste
vens, and White. Only three justices heard both Stanley and Ferber- Brennan, Marshall,
and White.
14 The movie which Ferber was prosecuted for selling showed young boys mastur-
bating. The New York statute under which Ferber was prosecuted prohibits among other
things, producing, selling, lending, exhibiting, or distributing materials depicting the
sexual performance of a child. N.Y. [PENAL] LAW, § 263.00(5) (McKinney 1980). A
performance can be a play, movie, photograph, or "any other visual representation
exhibited before an audience." Id. at § 263.00(4).
" Ferber 458 U.S. at 752.
16 Ferber was acquitted of selling obscene films but convicted of selling child
pornography. Id. The only issue before the Court was the constitutionality of a convic
tion for material that, due to the posture of the case, was in law not obscene. There is
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interest in preventing harm to a child resulting from sexual
exploitation "overwhelmingly outweighs"' 7 any presumptive first
amendment interest.
At first glance, the Ferber holding, because it deals only with
the public sale of child pornography, does not affect the at-
home privacy interests protected by the Stanley Court. Stanley
would seem to prevent making criminal the mere possession,
without more, of child pornography in the home just as it
prevents making the mere possession of obscenity criminal. Yet
there is another view
Not only do at least eight states presently have statutes that
make the knowing possession of child pornography a crime,'8
no indication in Ferber that a jury finding that the movies were obscene would have
been reversed under the Miller test. I believe it would be the rare case in which pictures
of children engaged in sexual activity could not meet the Miller test.
,7 Id. at 763-64. The Court commented that under Ferber not all portrayals of
child sexuality would be unconstitutional. Id. at 764. The Court did not, however,
provide guidance for differentiating between speech protected by the first amendment
and unprotected child pornography material. For a discussion of how to differentiate,
see infra text accompanying notes 243-48.
11 ALA. CODE §§ 13-A-12-192 (1982) (class C felony) (Miller obscenity only); ARiz.
Rav STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (1978) (class 2 felony); FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (1976) (3d
degree felony); ILL. REV STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1 (1979) (class 4 felony); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3516 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (class E felony); MINN. STAT. § 617.247 (1983) (gross
misdemeanor); Omio REv CODE ANN. § 2907.322 (Anderson Supp. 1984) (Ist degree
misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (2d degree felony); WASH.
REV CODE § 9.68A.07 (1984) (gross misdemeanor).
The recent amendments to the federal Sexual Exploitation of Children Act make
the receiving of sexually explicit material transported in interstate commerce a cnminal
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. 1984). The Act no longer requires either Miller
obscenity or a monetary purpose. Id., see Note, The Child Protection Act of 1984:
Child Pornography and the First Amendment, 9 SETON HALL 327, 344-48 (1985). If
interstate transportation can be shown, possession without more is a crime under federal
law punishable by up to $100,000 or up to 10 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b).
Punishment for a repeat offender is up to $200,000 or up to 15 years or both, with a
mandatory two-year minimum sentence. An organization may be fined up to $250,000.
Three of the states making child pornography possession a cnme also make criminal
possession with intent (or offer) to distribute when distribution requires no economic
motive. FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (2d degree felony); ILL. REv STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1
(still a class 4 felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (still a 2d degree felony). Several
other states make such possession with intent (or offer) a crime. ALAsKA STAT. §
11.61.125 (Supp. 1985) (class C felony); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (1985) (class D felony);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43-25 (Vernon 1974) (3d degree felony).
The underground child pornography market commonly includes the private non-
commercial production and exchange of child pornography. See mfra authorities cited
note 125. Frequently, the pedophile who possesses child pornography will also trade,
lend, and give it away. Thus, states that make it a crime to possess with intent (or offer)
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but the Supreme Court of Ohio just held its statute constitutional
under Stanley when applied to at-home possession.' 9 This reading
of Stanley is supported by the Attorney General's Commission
on Pornography2 which recently recommended making at-home
without economic motive are likely to catch within the statutory net most of the
pedophiles caught by states that make mere possession a crime. The major difference
between the two crimes is not in the number or kind of persons encompassed by the
statutory language-but in the comparative ease with which mere possession may be
prosecuted.
Obviously, the fact that mere possession is a crime (or arguably even possession
with intent) does not mean the legislatures in the above listed states have made criminal
at-home possession. Regarding each legislature at least three possibilities exist: (1) the
legislature was unaware of Stanley; (2) the legislature spoke in the context of Stanley.
Although no specific language exempts at-home possession, the legislature acted expecting
the courts to continue engrafting this exemption through caselaw; or (3) the legislature
acted thinking (or hoping) that Stanley no longer applied (never did apply) to child
pornography. Further speculation is fruitless. Legislatures may speak with one voice but
surely do not act with one mind. It is sufficient to note that, if the Constitution permits,
the statutory language in the above statutes would not preclude prosecution for at-home
possession.
'1 State v. Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 1986), cert. denied, 107.S. Ct. 1581
(1987).
20 A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 648-60. The Report contains nine
recommendations for state legislation:
(1) forfeiture of property used in or derived from child pornography;
(2) making child pornography production a felony;
(3) making it a felony to conspire to produce, exhibit, or distribute child pornog-
raphy or to provide children for use in child pornography;
(4) making it a felony to share information regarding the location of child pornog-
raphy;
(5) making it a felony to buy or sell children for use in child pornography;
(6) making child pornography featuring an adult sufficient evidence to convict the
featured adult of child molestation;
(7) making it possible to prove age of child in ways other than through the child's
testimony;
(8) reqmring photo finishing labs to report suspected child pornography;
(9) permitting lifetime probation for child pornographers and other pedophiles.
Id. at 648-71.
The Report contains seven recommendations for federal legislation:
(1) requiring producers of "sexually explicit visual depictions" to keep records
showing participant consent and age;
(2) prohibiting pornography participation for anyone under 21;
(3) prohibiting computer network child pornography information exchange;
(4) permitting postal service initiated forfeiture actions;
(5) defining "visual depiction" for child pornography and including undeveloped
film in the definition;
(6) providing financial incentives for state child pornography task forces;
(7) making it a felony to buy or sell children for use in child pornography.
Id. at 618-47. The Report also contains recommendations for state and federal law
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
possession of child pornography a crime. 21
How should at-home possession of child pornography be
treated? The policy implications attendant on the answer are
enormous, whether one focuses on protection of children or on
protection of individual liberties. Balancing these interests was
troubling for me.
22
enforcement agencies, for courts and correctional officers, for social service agencies,
and for the schools. Id. at 631-735.
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the efficacy, legality, and
need for each of the Commission's recommendations. Some recommendations may be
of questionable legality. The call for legislation declaring that a picture of an adult in
child pornography is sufficient to convict is one, for example, that troubles me. A court
may find that the depiction makes out a prima facie case. Under separation of powers
principles, I doubt that a legislature could require a court to so find. Cf. United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
Some of the recommended legislation seems unnecessary. I do not believe, for
example, that a legislative declaration is necessary for a court to permit a child's age to
be proved in some way other than through the child's testimony. Such express statutory
declaration is present in some of the current statutes. See, e.g., Mo. Cius. CODE §
568.100 (Supp. 1985). This declaration may represent a legislative response to court
decisions. If so, then I can only say that the decisions are misguided. In a statutory
rape case it obviously is necessary to prove that, at the time of the sexual activity, the
child was below the age of consent. Proof can be achieved through the child's testimony,
the parent's testimony, a birth certificate, or, I continue to believe, the jury's conclusion
from looking at the child. The same would hold true for child pornography.
21 A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 648-60. The Report briefly sum-
marizes the various uses made of child pornography besides sale or exchange. One use
is pedophilic sexual arousal. See, e.g., Hartman, Burgess & Lanning, Typology of
Collectors, in CILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RiNos 86 (A. Burgess ed. 1984). Another
use is enticement of children to participate. A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at
649. Finally, child pornography may be used to illustrate the activity desired of the
child. Id. at 649-50.
The Commission repeated the Ferber Court conclusions that the child participant
suffers harm from child pornography. In a very abbreviated fashion, the Commission
concluded that Ferber falls outside Stanley because while Stanley focused on the adult
at-home viewer's privacy rights, Ferber focused on the harm to children from pornog-
raphy. Id. at 658-60.
While it is comforting to encounter a reading similar to mine of Ferber and Stantey,
it also is troubling because of the ease with which the Commission found child pornog-
raphy different from the privacy interests of such concern in Stanley. More troubling,
however, is the failure of the Commission even to consider, much less assess, society's
costs in making at-home possession criminal.
11I owe a debt to several colleagues both for listening to me talk out my concerns
and for contributing opinions, ideas, and suggestions. I particularly thank Charles
Tremper, psychologist and lawyer, for reviewing my discussion of experts and data;
Roger Kirst for checking my evidence discussion to assure I was above an "embarassment
to self and school" standard; and to Richard Harnsberger and John Snowden for
worrying about the first amendment implications with me.
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Having seen the child victims of sexual abuse as well as the
difficulties of successful prosecutions, 23 I found myself easily
persuaded that making the possession of child pornography a
crime is necessary, right, and constitutional. Yet as a firm be-
liever in the principle that people have the right to think and
read as they please, I found myself horrified at the specter of
government intrusion and control over what a person is permit-
ted to read in the privacy of his or her own home-even in an
area of "speech" in which I find no redeeming social value. 2
As a professor of criminal law, I was troubled by both the ready
willingness to create a new crime and the potential extension of
government power that could ensue.25
How Stanley can be read to permit making at-home child
pornography possession a crime-and whether, even if a consti-
tutional crime under Stanley, a legislature should choose to make
it a crime-is the focus of this article. Discussing how is easy;
explaining why I think the legislation is warranted is more dif-
ficult.
I. STANLEY v GEORGIA
Let me begin by looking closely at what Stanley v Georga26
means today In deciding that the private possession of obscenity
was constitutionally protected, the Stanley Court stated, une-
quivocably and repeatedly, that there is a constitutional right,
at least in one's home, to read and watch what one pleases. 27
The Court described its objection to a possessory offense as
follows:
But we think that mere categorization of these films as
"obscene" is insufficient justification for such a drastic inva-
sion of personal liberties guaranteed by the First and Four-
" For a discussion of prosecution difficulties, see infra text accompanying notes
175-92.
1' Here I go further than Mr. Justice White in Ferber He admitted the possibility
that the social value in child pornography might reach the levels of "exceedingly modest"
or "de minimis." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 228-36 for a discussion of New York v. P.J.
Video, 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986) (search and seizure of first amendment materials).
- 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
" Id. at 564.
1987-88]
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teenth Amendments. Whatever may be the reach of other
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into
the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.
And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of indi-
vidual liberty, Georgia asserts the right to protect the individ-
ual's mind from the effects of obscenity 21
Much has been written about the breadth and constitutional
underpinnings of Stanley, both by the Court in its own later
opinions29 and by a host of commentators.30 It is clear today
that Stanley neither protects all consensual adult conduct en-
gaged in privately at home3' nor insulates obscenity or child
pornography possessed and shown privately outside the home.
3 2
While the Stanley Court did not rest its decision directly on
the assumption that the private consumption of obscenity harms
no one, obviously that assumption partially explains its decision
to insulate at-home use. The Stanley Court noted that a state
constitutionally may make criminal at-home possession of stolen
goods, or drugs, or firearms (or, by extension, explosives and
noxious chemicals) 33 without offending any Stanley privacy in-
terests. Although these possessory crimes are distinguishable from
obscemty because they implicate no first amendment interests,
1 Id. at 565.
29 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); United States v. Orito,
413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971);
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
30 See, e.g., Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 SUP. CT.
REv 203; Ratner, Social Importance of Prurient Interest-Obscenity Regulation v.
Thought-Privacy, 42 So. CAL. L. REv 587 (1969); Note, Stanley v. Georgia: A First
Amendment Approach to Obscenity Control, 31 Osno ST. L.J. 364 (1970).
11 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11. Any lingering doubts that Stanley protected all
consensual at-home private conduct were laid to rest in Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (State
constitutionally may make criminal at-home adult consensual homosexual conduct.).
31 See cases cited supra note 11. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 ("Stanley did
protect conduct that would not have been protected outside the home, and it partially
prevented the enforcement of state obscenity laws; but the decision was firmly grounded
in the First Amendment.").
11 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 and n.11.
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other crimes, such as the government's power to make criminal
the possession of written material involving national security
interests, another crime the Stanley Court mentioned expressly,
34
surely do implicate first amendment interests.
Thus the notion that obscemty consumption by itself causes
no real harm necessarily rests somewhere close to the surface of
the opinion in Stanley The case for distinguishing child pornog-
raphy is made on this basis.
II. WHAT Is NOT DISTINGUISHABLE ABOUT CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
Before making the case for distinguishing child pornography,
let me begin at the other end and discuss the ways in which
child pornography may not be distinguished-at least without
directly overruling what remains of Stanley, that proscription of
obscemty requires a semblance of commercial or public or out-
of-home use.
35
A. Unprotected Speech
The simple fact, for example, that child pornography is
unprotected speech most assuredly would not put it outside the
reach of Stanley Although one might quarrel with the conclu-
sion that obscenity is outside the ambit of the first amendment, 36
3 Id.
3 It is not my purpose in this article to argue for or against the retention of the
Stanley rule. If Stanley goes, then obviously at-home child pornography possession
constitutionally may be made criminal. My purpose is to evaluate whether the Court
may uphold Stanley regarding at-home possession of obscenity and yet find it inappli-
cable to child pornography.
36 I believe that the Court is wrong in excluding obscenity for two reasons. First,
excluding some speech may chill other speech which, although protected, sits definition-
ally close to the boundary between protected and unprotected speech. Second, the
distinction between protected and unprotected speech is an unpersuasive rationale and
not specific as to its limitations.
Obscenity conveys ideas and emotions. The rationale for its exclusion from the
protected ambit sounds to me simply like a state conclusion that obscenity conveys a
bad message. Yet protection of the unpopular message is the foundation of first amend-
ment protections.
I do not quarrel with the societal judgment that some viewpoints are repugnant or
even detrimental to the societal fabric. I quarrel with vesting in government the right to
1987-88]
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the Supreme Court of the United States consistently has held
that obscenity is excluded. 37 Yet the fact that obscenity is un-
protected speech did not prevent the Stanley Court from holding
that its possession at home was insulated from criminal prose-
cution.18 It follows that even the most creative sophist could not
succeed with an attempt to move child pornography out from
under Stanley merely by stating that child pornography is un-
protected speech.
B. Direct Harm
In Stanley the State argued that viewing obscenity is criminal
because viewing causes harm to the viewer that society should
attempt to avoid. 39 The Stanley Court rejected this attempt to
protect the viewer's nund from what the State argued is the
pernicious influence of .obscenity 4o To the extent that obscenity
conveys ideas41 (whether the joy of sex or the subjugation of
women) and that ideas by definition cause impact, shielding a
consenting adult viewer from the impact of an idea runs directly
against traditional first amendment values. 42 The expectation that
speech can influence and persuade is, after all, a major premise
underlying the societal protection afforded speech.
In rejecting a possession crime justified on the theory of
preventing the impact of the obscenity, the Stanley Court essen-
tially employed a first amendment analysis to speech unprotected
under the first amendment. 43 Whether one applauds or criticizes
silence those viewpoints. Today's right-thinking government might be yesterday's Ger-
many under Hitler. In any event it should be the speech-not societal conclusions as to
its worth-that determines its staying power.
The most that can be said about obscenity as unprotected speech is that, although
the underlying rationale easily could encompass all unpopular speech, obscenity can
usually be contained by focusing on the sexual (and speech plus) message conveyed.
31 See cases cited supra note 7
11 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969).
11 Id. at 566-67.
10 Id. at 565-66.
41 Ideas may stimulate emotions as well as the intellect. E.g., Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
41 See generally, T. EMERSoN, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970);
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Henkin, Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv 391 (1963).
41 As a consequence, some argued that Stanley presaged first amendment protection
for obscenity. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 30, at 593.
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this approach, no good reason exists for the Court to abandon
it when child pornography is concerned. Protection of the adult
viewer from himself constitutes no more a sufficient state interest
when the at-home adult privately views child pornography than
when he views obscenity depicting adults.
C. Consequential Harm
The next argument for distinguishing Stanley obscemty from
child pornography is based on the difference in societal harm
which results if a viewer is induced by his or her viewing to
commit harmful, even criminal acts. 44 This argument focuses on
the harm the viewer might cause to others as a result of the
viewing rather than on the direct harm to the viewer caused by
the viewing.
The State argued in Stanley that obscenity viewing often is
a condition precedent to a greater harm, the commission of
serious crimes. 5 The State asserted the power to anticipate and
to avoid the greater harm by prosecuting obscenity viewing just
as it avoids the greater harm, i.e., the completed crime,46 by
prosecuting an attempt. The Stanley Court refused to counte-
nance possession prosecutions based on a theory of consequential
harm.47 The Court rejected this approach again by essentially
using a first amendment analysis .
48
In part, the Court based its refusal on the absence of evi-
dence showing a causal connection between obscenity and crime49
(translated into first amendment language this means that no
argument could be maintained that obscenity creates a "clear
and present danger" of societal harm).50 Even if causation could
See A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 304-06.
" Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
,6 Questions in attempt law include how far past preparation the person must act
so as not to punish solely for the bad mens rea. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 5.05 comment
(Tent. Draft No. 10 1960). A related question is whether to punish the attempt as
seriously as the completed cr-me. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1962) and
comment (Tent. Draft No. 10 1960) with J. WATE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED
CRIME 8-9 (1943).
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
" Id.
49 Id.
10 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled in part, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
1987-88]
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be shown, however, the Court indicated it still would have
rejected an at-home possession crime because the government
should punish the harm arguably caused-in other words the
crime-not the receipt or the transmission of the thought leading
to the harm
I. 5
1. The Case for Saying Child Pornography Is Different
The Stanley conclusion that no empirical evidence exists to
support a viewing-doing connection 52 probably is distinguishable
from what is known today about child pornography 51 Appar-
ently virtually all child sexual abusers possess child pornogra-
phy 54 While not all consumers of child pornography abuse
children, the congruence of abusers and pornography is troubling
and supports some connection, although not necessarily causal,
between the person who looks at-child sex and the person who
has sex with children.
55
Not only is there a viewing-doing connection where child
pornography is concerned, but a child victim is qualitatively
different from an adult victim. Thus the Stanley Court deter-
51 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
52 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566. Indeed, at least for cases in which violent obscenity
is concerned, current research seems to support a viewing/doing associational connection
even for adults. See A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 309-34. I do not find
this particularly surprising. We assume, after all, that good literature uplifts and enno-
bles. Why should not the converse also be true? Cf. H. EYSENCK, PSYCHOLOGY Is ABOUT
PEOPLE 256 (1972).
51 See, e.g., Belanger, Conner, Copenhafer & D'Agostino, Scope of the Problem:
Investigation and Prosecution in CHrLD PORNOGaRAPY AND Sax RINGS 25-50 (A. Burgess
ed. 1984); Hartman, Burgess, & Lanning, supra note 21, at 93-109.
4 See, e.g., Effect of Pornography, supra note 1, at 143 ("[Wl]ithout exception,
every pedophile we interviewed admitted to owning an extensive collection of adult and
child porn.") (statement of Daniel Campagna); Hartman, Burgess, & Lanning, supra
note 21, at 93 (1984); FINKELHOR, CmiD SExuAL ABUSE 42-43 (1981); Davidson, Sexual
Exploitation of Children: An Overview of its Scope, Impact, and Legal Ramifications,
F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 26, 27 (Feb. 1984); Comment, Preying on Playgrounds:
The Sexploitation of Children in Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L. Ray
809, 814-17 (1978).
" The evidence is not sufficient to prove causation. See generally A.G. Pornog-
raphy Report, supra note 3, at 901-1035; PORNOGRAhY AND SExuAL AGGRMSSION (N.
Malamuth and E. Donnerstem 1984); Hartman, Burgess, & Lanning, supra note 21, at
83-92.
[VoL. 76
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION
mination-that a state's interest in crime prevention is suffi-
ciently satisfied by pumshing the doing even if viewing and doing
are connected, 56 Is inapplicable to the child victim. Although
harm exists to both children and adult victims of nonconsensual
or violent crime, at any level (except possibly death) the harm
to a child will be perceived as more serious than the equivalent
harm to an adult.
If viewing stimulates the adult possessor to engage in non-
violent, consensual activity with another adult, this activity either
is not criminal or, if criminal, is not a crime a state would
prosecute. 57 This is not the case when child pornography stim-
ulates the possessor to have nonviolent sexual activity with a
child: this activity is always a serious crime. With respect to
consequential harm, then, if sexual activity relates to viewing,
sexual activity always harms a child and always more seriously
than sexual activity harms an adult.
2. The Case Against
Thus the question of consequential harm as a way to distin-
guish obscenity and child pornography under Stanley is a closer
question than that of direct harm because with consequential
harm the danger is both greater (since its impact falls on a child)
and closer (since for child pornography an associational connec-
tion exists between viewing and doing that was absent from the
state's showing in Stanley regarding obscenity). Yet this distin-
guishung ground ultimately must fail because it intrudes too
closely on what is right about Stanley-that citizens should be
able to think and to read what they want without governmental
sanction, at least until a direct causative link is shown. A focus
on potentially causative harmful impact is simply insufficient
justification to override the Stanley first amendment concerns.
In addition, this focus opens the door to other problems.
m The task of distinguishing on this basis admittedly is difficult because the Stanley
Court's conclusion that pumshing the act itself is sufficient clearly formed the more
telling basis for rejecting the State's legal position.
11 The argument frequently is made that viewing obscemty enhances adults' sex
lives. A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 343.
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Some pedophiles, 8 for example, use adult obscenity to en-
gage in sexual acts with children. 59 If the projected harm to the
child is sufficient to stop child pornography viewing, then this
rationale might mean the end of Stanley even for at-home view-
ing of adult obscenity
D The Aid and Abet Theory
An attempt to distinguish child pornography from obscemty
on the basis of aid and abet theory also should fail if Stanley
still lives. Because Stanley was tried for possession 6° (as a prin-
cipal) and not for distribution or production (on an aid and abet
theory of culpability), no aid and abet argument was relevent
and none was made. Thus nothing in the Stanley opimon directly
addresses this theory of state power to prosecute on possession
facts alone.
61
The Model Penal Code makes a person responsible for the
criminal activity of another when, "with the purpose of pro-
moting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he aids
or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or
committing it, or having a legal duty to prevent the commission
of the offense, falls to make proper effort so to do. "62 Of
course, a variety of views exists of how direct one's conduct
must be to make one an aider in the criminal law
Consider the plight of Herbert Wilcox, 63 the newspaper pub-
lisher convicted of aiding an alien to work illegally in England.
Wilcox attended and reviewed an illegal jazz concert. A literal
reading of the court's opinion leads to the conclusion that Wil-
cox's willing (and paid for) attendance at a concert he knew to
be illegal was an encouragement sufficient to constitute aiding
11 For purposes of this article "pedophile" is defined as an adult whose sexual
preferences run to children and not other adults. A pedophile need not act out his sexual
preferences but if he does, he acquires his child victims through some form of "entice-
ment" rather than through physical force.
'9 A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 411 n.74.
o Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558.
6' No one in Stanley argued accomplice liability on a theory of aiding the distn-
bution by the purchase.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Final Tent. Draft 1962).
61 Wilcox v. Jeffery, 1 All E.R. 464 (K.B. 1951).
CHImD PORNOGrAPHY POSSESSION
without regard to the additional assistance provided by the fa-
vorable review he gave the concert. 64
It is a traditional law school exercise to inquire into the
culpability of each of the patrons who also paid to attend the
concert. The consensus conclusion most frequently reached is
that under the court's reasoning each patron is guilty of aiding
but that no prosecutor would prosecute because of time con-
straints and fear of public outcry The important point for my
purposes is that Wilcox illustrates a broad but by no means
unique version of aid and abet theory that supports a production
or a distribution guilty verdict of a purchaser in the production
chain who acts with knowledge of the initial illegal activity
In Wilcox the concert was performed in public65 while in
Stanley the obscemty was viewed at home. Nevertheless, the
distinction is irrelevant for aid and abet theory in which the focus
is on the quality of the assistance and the intent of the assistant.
6
Privacy as its own interest is relevant to liability only if the thing
done in private and not communicated logically cannot be said
to "aid."
In Stanley's case, assuming a public or commercial transac-
tion, a patron aids not only by purchasing obscene material but
also by belonging to a class of consumers but for whose existence
the distributor and the producer would not act. Since no com-
" Id.
6, Id.
6 For that matter, aiding and abetting need not necessarily require the principal's
awareness that he is being assisted. See, e.g., State v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 739 (Ala. 1894).
Although under Stanley, an aid and abet theory based on positive acts of encourage-
ment and assistance does not distinguish obscenity from child pornography, there is a
possible difference based on the legal duty in many-states to report child abuse. Because
no equivalent duty to act arises when adult sexual activity is depicted, an argument
might be made that the purchaser/viewer of child pornography aids production and
distribution in a way the purchaser/viewer of adult sex materials could not. The former
aids by his failure to act rather than in any encouragement or assistance represented by
the purchase. For a discussion of child reporting statutes and how they may be used to
distinguish Stanley, see mnfra text accompanying notes 137-42.
The more direct and cleaner approach, however, is to permit prosecution for the
possession. Accomplice liability theory, after all, focuses on the aid and comfort given
the principal by the aider and the nature and degree of the aider's activity. As to that,
there is no difference between the consumer of adult obscenity and the consumer of
child pornography. The difference is in the harm caused by the consumer in his or her
own right.
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mercial production of obscenity exists without a market, 67 the
at-home possessor aids in the production and the distribution.
This aid and abet argument works just fine as a theoretical
exercise but fails upon re-examination of the Stanley opinion. 6
In upholding freedom of thought and of privacy in the context
of a possessory offense, the Stanley decision must be read to
reject holding Stanley liable on the theory of aiding and abetting
obscenity distribution. 69 Otherwise, without requinng any addi-
tional activity or without pointing to a change, however slight,
from the Stanley facts, privacy and freedom of thought may be
infringed merely by redefining the crime committed.
E. Ferber v New York
As discussed earlier °70 the factual setting in Ferber concerned
the public dissemination of child pornography and no Stanley
privacy question even arguably was at issue. In discussing why
the obscenity standard is inapplicable to child pornography, the
Court made some very broad and emphatic statements about
both the harm to children that child pornography causes and
the state's interest in protecting children .7 From these statements
comes the argument that Ferber qualifies Stanley
67 A large amount of child pornography production and distribution is both home-
produced and non-commercial. See authorities cited infra note 125. Obviously an aiding
and abetting argument would not work for this part of the market unless non-commercial
production and distribution are made criminal. The federal government and many states
have now done just that. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1984 Supp.). Even so, the pedophile
who produces his own child pornography is unlikely to be deterred by the absence of
others with whom to share.
An additional question regarding aiding and abetting is whether it is an available
theory for culpability when the child pornography is produced outside the state or
outside the United States. For a discussion of the power and appropriateness of a state
sanctioning conduct that takes place in another jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying
notes 154-63.
1, I say this although with child pornography it may be possible to make a
successful aider and abettor argument that was not persuasive to the Court in Stanley.
See supra note 66. In Stanley it was quite clear that the Court, in sub silentio seeing no
harm in adult pornography, would not have been receptive to the idea of accomplice
liability.
Or on a theory of conspiracy to distribute it.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
7, Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
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The Ferber Court focused on a state's interest in protecting
child welfare, 72 a "government objective of surpassing impor-
tance." 73 This state interest comes mainly from two sources: a
state's legitimate interest in assisting parents to protect and to
nurture children;74 and its independent obligation to protect chil-
dren from physical or from moral injury that would impede
their growth into responsible, well-rounded, caring, and capable
adults.7
5
The precedent-making nature of the Ferber holding was that
the obscemty standard need not be reached to make public
dealing in child pornography a constitutional crime. 76 The Ferber
Court rejected the use of the obscenity standard to differentiate
between legal and illegal child pornography for the commonsense
reason that if the activity depicted causes harm to a child, then
that harm is no less real because the work, taken as a whole, is
not obscene. 77 The Court held that although not obscene, child
pornography of the kind involved in Ferber is outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment because a state's interest in pre-
venting the harm to children resulting from sexual exploitation
"overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at
stake. ",78
In deciding that child pornography causes harm to a child,
the Ferber Court examined the harm that may result solely from
the existence of the visual depiction as well as the harm caused
72 Id. at 755. The Court cited to several of its opinions in which it afforded greater
scrutiny and protection to rights and interests of children than those of adults. See, e.g.,
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (under statutory authority prohibit-
ing broadcast of indecent language, F.C.C. may sanction broadcaster of indecent but
nonobscene speech due in part to interest in protecting children); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state may protect children from exposure to material not obscene
for adults on theory that it is obscene for children); Pnnce v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (under state child labor law, states may prohibit use of children to distribute
religious material despite first amendment impact).
This past term the Court added yet another decision to this list. Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (state may protect child listeners by
disciplining child speaker for giving lewd speech at school assembly).
,3 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
7, See id.
" See id.
76 Id.
7 Id.
Is Id. at 763-64.
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to the child by participation in the sexual activity depicted. 79
Whether the Ferber holding rests on a finding that child por-
nography by itself harms a child participant or on a finding that
child pornography-plus the sexual activity and entire atmos-
phere of the pornography enterprise-harms a child is not en-
tirely clear What is clear is that every member of the Court
found that child pornography constitutes child abuse.80
The case for distinguishing child pornography from the Stan-
ley setting rests ultimately on the Ferber Court finding that child
pornography causes harm to children.8 The stronger the showing
of harm caused by the pornography, the easier is the policy
decision to make at-home possession criminal since even incre-
mental law enforcement gains protect children. The converse
also is true: the less clear the showing that harm is caused, the
less clear that incremental law enforcement gains protect children
at all.
III. JUST WHAT Is THE HARm AND JUST WHAT CAUSES IT?
The notion that a child can be harmed simply by knowing
that pornography depicting him or her exists and may be seen
seems intuitively correct. Because pornography remains a present
fact, the harm it causes has the capacity to recur in a way that
actual sexual abuse-however injurious-does not.
A sexually abused child may remember unrecorded sexual
activity The child may even worry that someone might disclose
his or her sexual past. The child knows, however, that the
,9 Id. at 759,
10 Five members of the Court-Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and White-form the majority opinion. Of the concurrences filed, Justice
O'Connor wrote to emphasize the harm to a child caused by child pornography. Id. at
775. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens all agreed that there is serious harm caused.
Id. at 775-77. Justice Blackman concurred in the result without opinion. It is difficult
to explain his concurrence without assuming he agreed that child pornography harms
children.
81 It is possible to distinguish between child pornography and the Stanley case on
the basis of the burglar tool analogy (and the harm to children from sexual activity) or
on the affirmative reporting obligation arguably applicable to child pornography viewing.
But I believe the case for a child pornography exception stands or falls on a showing
of harm. Certainly for Justices Brennan and Marshall this issue of harm is determinative.
Id. at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 128-29 (discus-
sion of burglar tool analogy).
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number of people who saw what he or she did is small: the sex
occurred in private, not in an amphitheater This child probably
believes, with reason, that each day decreases the likelihood that
his or her sexual past will be disclosed.
The child pornography victim, however, must live with the
possibility that his or her activity may be seen years after his or
her participation and by an ever-increasing number of people.
2
As compared to the child whose activity was not photographed,
the pornography victim faces a greater possibility that his or her
sexual activity will not remain secret, a continuing possibility of
disclosure, and certainly a decreased likelihood that, if disclosed,
he or she successfully can protect his or her privacy and repu-
tation by denying participation.8
3
Assume, for example, that Ida Innocent, a seven-year-old
child, and Peter Predator, a 35-year-old pedophile, live in a
small town. Assume Ida had sex with Peter, and Peter photo-
graphed these encounters. Although Ida no longer sees or asso-
ciates with Peter, he retains these pictures and continues to enjoy
looking at them. Worse, as is the pedophile's penchant, he has
shared the pictures with others having a similar pedophilic in-
terestA4 Thus Peter's continuing intrusion of Ida's privacy is
compounded by the intrusion of additional viewers. 85
The pictures depict Ida engaging in various sex acts with
Peter; they probably represent a shameful episode to her Al-
," Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1982). See authorities cited infra
note 94.
" Children understand the permanence of a picture. K. Lannmg, supra note 21,
at 83-84. They have attempted burglaries to obtain the pictures. Id. One commentator
even insinuates that the permanence of a picture is more harmful than the sexual activity
depicted. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17
WAKE FoR.sT L. Rav 535, 545 (1981).
94 See generally authorities cited infra note 125.
" Ferber 458 U.S. at 760 n.10. And this is not all. These additional pedophiles
also may prey on Ida themselves. The threat of public dissemination of the pictures may
be enough to coerce Ida into cooperation. A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at
650. Consider in this light the decision by the Miss America Pageant to divest Vanessa
Williams of her crown once nude and suggestive pictures of her were published. Consider
the argument made by the child plaintiffs in Faloona v. Hustler Magazine that publi-
cation of their nude pictures in Hustler damaged their reputations and placed them in a
false light. 799 F.2d 1000, 1004-07 (5th Cir. 1986). Consider also the child who became
suicidal after news of her child porn participation hit the papers. Schoettle, Child
Exploitation: A Study of Child Pornography, 19 J. AM. AcAD. CmLD PSYCHIATRY 289,
292 (1980).
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though Ida may try to, and may succeed in, disassociating herself
from Peter and her sexual activity with him, she knows the
pictures still exist and that Peter still looks at them. She either
knows or suspects that he has shown them to others. Ida has
the additional worry that those outside the pedophilic under-
world may see the pictures and recognize her This could happen
in a variety of ways.
Peter (or one of the pedophiles with whom he has shared)
might sell the pictures to a magazine sold under the table in a
local bookstore.8 6 A salesperson could flip through the pages,
recognize Ida, and tell others. Peter's home (or the home of one
of the pedophiles with whom he has shared) might be burglarized
and the pictures taken. His housecleaner (or the housecleaner of
one of the pedophiles with whom he has shared) could come
across them inadvertently
As yet another possibility, Peter (or one of the pedophiles
with whom he has shared) could be arrested and the photographs
found during a legal search. The police, the prosecutor, the
defense counsel, the office staff of each of these, and, if the
case goes to trial, the judge, the judge's clerk, the judge's
secretary, the bailiff, the jury, the witnesses, and perhaps even
the trial spectators may see the pictures. Any of these people,
whether ethically or not, might talk to others.
Suppose Ida is twelve or fourteen when her pornography
participation becomes public information (or worse, suppose Ida
was twelve or fourteen rather than seven when the pictures were
taken). Although the law may treat her participation as noncon-
sensual, the pictures show a participant who appears willing.
Those with knowledge of these pictures could include Ida's
neighbor, a potential employer, a spouse, a friend, or a relative
of a potential employer or a spouse. Many of those with knowl-
edge will define Ida's character and her morality based on these
pictures.17 Even those who do not hold her morally culpable
16 Obviously we would not expect Peter to sell the pictures if he could be identified
through them. But the pictures could be of Ida by herself, or of Ida with another child,
or even of Ida with Peter when Peter's back is to the camera.
" See generally Burgess, Hartman, McCausland, & Powers, Impact of Child
Pornography and Sex Rings on Child Victims and Their Families, in CsMLD PoRoG-
RAPHY AND Sax RINos 111-26 (A. Burgess ed. 1984).
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may keep distant through worry about the effect of the sexual
abuse on her adult mental stability or on her ability to be a
caring and responsible parent. s8
The likelihood of disclosure of Ida's early sexual initiation
or child pornography participation may not be great but the
impact of any disclosure certainly will be. In any event, Ida
cannot calculate the risk of disclosure and she probably will
spend a lifetime worrying.
I have just outlined the intuitive case for saying that child
pornography in and of itself harms children. This intuition is
shared by at least some of the psychiatric or medical experts
who have worked with child pornography victims. 89 Based on
their work with child pornography and sex abuse victims, these
experts seem to agree that a child depicted in pornography
suffers injury not only from participation in the sexual activity
but also by having to deal with the existence of an always
available permanent record. At best, however, their conclusions
are based on limited clinical sampling and are not identified
clearly as deriving solely from child pornography as distinct from
the sexual activity depicted or another pornography-related con-
sequence. 90
In apparent recognition of the equivocal nature of the foun-
dation for these expert conclusions, the Attorney General's Com-
mission on Pornography recommends additional research directed
specifically at separating the harm caused by the depiction alone
from all the other harm caused by pornography-related activi-
" There is data showing sexually abused children becoming child sex abusers when
they are adults. See, e.g., Ferber 458 U.S. at 757 n.9; A.G. Pornography Report, supra
note 3, at 613. The impact of child sex abuse on adult emotional stability also has been
well documented. See, e.g., Berliner, Blick, & Buckley, Expert Testimony on the Dy-
namics of Intra-Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development in
ABA NATIONAL LEGAL REsoURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD
SExUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW (5th ed. 1984); Knuckman, The Role of Community Mental
Health Centers, in CHnD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEx RINGS 149 (A. Burgess ed. 1984);
Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REv 977 (1969); Shouvlin, supra note 83, at 535, 539; Burgess,
Hartman, McCausland, & Powers, supra note 87, at 119-20; Stack, Preventing the
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The New York Experience, 56 N.Y.S. BAR J. I1, 12
(Feb. 1984).
" See infra notes 93-94.
90 See authority cited infra note 94.
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ties. 9' If the argument for child pornography harm rests solely
on the limited research presently available, without regard either
to the intuition that harm is caused 2 or to the associated harm
unarguably caused by child pornography participation, the Fer-
ber result would be troubling,9 both because the experts so far
9' A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 731.
92 I am hardly an expert on the use of social science data by courts and legislators.
My intuitive sense, however, is that when limited expert findings do not match an
intuitive judgment about the way things work, judges-and the rest of us-would be
strongly inclined to reject the expert findings as insubstantial or inconclusive. I think
this response is warranted.
91 Ferber 458 U.S. at 758-59. n.10. The Ferber Court was able to point to three
sources that child pornography by itself harms children. Together, they hardly make a
strong case.
One source, a psychiatrist who works with abused children, described his experience
with one 12-year-old child. Schoettle, supra note 85, at 289, 292; Schoettle, Treatment
of the Child Pornography Patient, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1109, 1110 (1980). He notes
that "[t]here is no literature available concerning the psychiatric consequences of children
having been involved in photographed sexual encounters " Schoettle, supra note
85, at 291 (emphasis added). His conclusion that the pictures by themselves cause harm
apparently is based on his clinical experiences (a 12-year-old threatened suicide once her
pornography participation became public) as well as some general literature suggesting
that non-violent sexual episodes in themselves do not harm children: it is the fear of
disclosure (as well as family reaction and lack of professional intervention) that does
the damage. See, e.g., Burgess & Holmstrom, Sexual Trauma of Children and Adoles-
cents: Pressure, Sex, and Secrecy, 10 NuRsiNG CLas. N. AMER. 551, 556-58 (1975)
(disclosure of the sexual activity is a key factor, and the victim's emotional reaction is
influenced by how and why the secret is disclosed).
The second source relied on by the Ferber Court was a lawyer who worked with
abused chidren and who described his intuitive conclusion. Shouvlin, supra note 83, at
545.
The third source was a student note that includes an interview with a child
psychiatrist who says that "the victim's knowledge of publication" of the pornography
"increases the emotional and psychic harm." Note, Protection of Children from Use in
Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 295, 301 (1979).
The case for showing harm from child pornography alone, moreover, is not
universally accepted. First, it can be argued that the harm suffered by fear of disclosure
results from society's refusal to see a child's seemingly willing participation as victimi-
zation and that the harm would disappear if only societal attitudes were changed so that
a child pornography victim could feel no more ashamed than a child robbery victim
does. Cf. Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932).
In Stephenson, the defendant kidnapped and raped a .woman, While the defendant
still held the woman, she took poison. She then refused his offer of hospitalization.
After being returned to her parents she lingered ten days and then died. The Stephenson
Court held that the defendant caused the victim's death even though (1) the only physical
injuries he inflicted were bite wounds and (2) the victim's subsequent irresponsibility
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have little evidence upon which to base their conclusions and
because of the difficulties associated with research in this area. 94
Fortunately, the harm need not be evaluated on this basis.
Since not all things are susceptible of proof, reliance on shared
intuition is neither unacceptable to the Court 5 nor invalid as
(taking the poison) probably was caused by the humiliation of the rape not by her
physical wounds. See Comment, Criminal Law and Procedure-Homocide-Causal Re-
lation Between Defendant's Unlawful Act and the Death, 31 MICH. L. Rv 659, 668-
74 (1933). In a real sense, the victim's shame, plus her feeling of societal disapprobation,
caused her death, not Stephenson's acts.
Second, not only is it clinically difficult to separate the harm caused by child
pornography from that caused by the sex act and other pornography related activity,
but clinical work is a methodology considered inferior to controlled empirical experiments
using the scientific method. See generally D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION (1969);
R. NisBETT & L. Ross, HtrmIAN INFERENCE (1980); Eysenck, Sex, Violence, and the
Media: Where Do We Stand Now?, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGRESSION 305 (N.
Malamuth & E. Donnerstein ed. 1984). It ethically is not possible to set up actual
experiments with children testing the effects of abuse or child pornography participation
or disclosure by abusing one group of children and then comparing their reactions
against those of an unabused control group. Clinical work takes place in the real world
with real human emotions, not in a laboratory where all but one variable, the harm
caused by the pornography itself, can be held constant. At best there is inevitable
imprecision in these circumstances when gauging causation and degree of harm. Cer-
kovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Myths, Research, and Policy Implications, 89
DicK. L. Rv. 691-719 (1985); Meehl, Theoretical Risks and Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl,
Sir Ronald, and the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology, 46 J. CONSULTING AND CLIN.
PSYCH. 806 (1978). See Wilson, Violence, Pornography and Social Science, in TiH
PORNOGRAPHY CONTROVERSY 238-43 (1975) (R. Rist ed. 1975).
To the extent clinicians develop the data relied on, additional difficulties arise. A
clinician can be naive. Clinicians are trained to believe patients, not to evaluate with
suspicion. Cf. D. O'BRIEN, Two OF A KIND: Tm HILLSIDE STRANGLERS (1985). I know
of a psychiatrist who testifies fairly regularly at criminal trials. He feels that clinicians
may be the least equipped to distinguish truth from lies because to a large degree this
distinction is irrelevant to their work: if a patient relays a story that is false, his inaccurate
perception or untruthfulness is part of his sickness.
The clinician's interest, moreover, properly is in the patient, not in a world view
of how to deal with a problem. If a possibility exists, however slight, of harm resulting
from pornography, then the clinician's inclination will be to urge action to eliminate it.
Among the problems associated with experts is knowing when you have a reliable
one. They are no more infallible or more uniformly wise and ethical than the rest of
us. They sometimes disagree with each other (Every insanity prosecution, after all, has
an expert on each side, looking at the same individual and the same event and coming
to contradictory conclusions.). Experts also may offer opinions beyond a responsible
point suggested by the state of their research. See, e.g., Melton, Developmental Psy-
chology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J. FAM. L. 445, 457-58 (1983-84).
11 The Court repeatedly has said that legislative findings need not reach scientific
certainty before a legislature may act. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846
(1986); see, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-65 (1973); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968).
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forming at least a partial basis upon which decisions may be
made. In evaluating policy choices, ignoring our perceptions of
the way things work and the way people act is both absurd and
impractical. To ignore this intuition when we think that the
result will bring serious harm to children is unacceptable.
The question, then, is not whether to rely on intuitive judg-
ments but just how much to rely in the absence of other proof.
This is a very difficult question to answer when the corollary
interests-privacy and free speech-are also significant, and when
reliance on intuition risks infringement with arguably little show-
ing that children will be benefitted.
This question need not be answered here, however, because
indisputable evidence exists that child pornography harms chil-
dren. As the Ferber Court recognized, the harm to a child
pornography participant like Ida is not only her loss of privacy
and her fear of disclosure but encompasses as well the inter-
twined and inseparable harms caused by child pornography par-
ticipation.
96
A direct, probably causal, relationship exists between the
child pornography market and child sex abuse depicted in por-
nography The prime purpose of commercially produced child
pornography, after all, is neither to satisfy the child's adult
partner sexually nor to provide vicarious pleasure to the por-
nography producer* its purpose is to produce the child pornog-
raphy to be sold. Since the market for depiction of child sexual
abuse encourages and adds to instances of this abuse, the
Ferber Court readily concluded that harm to the child from child
pornography properly includes harm caused by participation in
the sexual activity depicted. 98
This conclusion is substantiated by the inability of many
experts even to separate out the harms caused. Some experts
6 See Ferber 458 U.S. at 758. "It has been found that sexually exploited children
are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have sexual dys-
functions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults." Id. at n.9 (citing
Schoettle, supra note 85 at 296; Schoettle, supra note 93 at 1110; Densen-Gerner, infra
note 152 at 80).
Id. at 759-60.
', Id. at 758 n.9, 759-60. The Court also noted a pressing need to go after
distributors because the underground child pornography market made it difficult to get
the producers. Id.
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relied on by the Court,99 and a few who have come forward
since Ferber,'°° seem unable to unravel the harm caused by the
child pornography alone from the harm derived from the collec-
tive abuse-the enticement or desensitizing, the participation in
the sexual activity, the selling and the trading of children on an
underground pornography market, and the harm caused by the
permanence of the record.
In a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, for
example, one expert was asked: "How harmful is it for a child
to be photographed in a sexually explicit position? What is the
long range impact on the psyche or life of that child?" Her
response was: "It is not just that photograph but it is what
happens before, what happens afterward, where all of the photos
go. And there [sic] always are sexually molested, abused, raped,
whatever, that is all part of the whole scene."''
Now consider the differences between child pornography and
adult obscemty both in the degree of harm the participant suffers
from the participation and in the level of societal interest in
preventing that harm. When children are concerned, virtual un-
animity exists that serious harm results from participation in
sexual activity 102 Virtually no one removed from the pedophile
and the child pornography underground argues that this harm
to children is imaginary At the very least, production of child
Id. at 758 n.9.
100 See, e.g., CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RINGS (A Burgess ed. 1984); Statement
of John Rabun, Dpty. Dir., Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, Effect of
Pornography, supra note I at 133, 145.
01 Question by Arlen Spector, Sen., Pa., Answer by Ann Burgess, Prof. Psychiatric
Nursing, Univ. Pa., Effect of Pornography, supra note 1 at 148.
101 In western society there is almost unanimous agreement that early sexual activity,
particularly in an exploitive relationship, causes harm to a child. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST, ASSAULT, SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION 7 (1981); Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Sen. Hearing No. 98-
1267 (Sept. 12, 1984); R. HOLMS, Tim SEx OFFENDER AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 91-103 (1983); Green, Children and Pornography: An Interest Analysis in System
Perspective, 19 VA. LAW REv 441 (1985); Lanning & Burgess, Child Pornography and
Sex Rings, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (January 1984); Shouvlin, supra note 83-
at 535; Stack, supra note 88, at 11; Note, Protection of Children From Use in Pornog-
raphy: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 J. OF LAW REFORm 295
(1979); Note, supra note 18, at 327; Comment, supra note 54, at 809; authorities cited
supra note 88. But see G. Wilson and D. Cox, THE CHILD LovERs [A STUDY OF
PAEDOPHILES IN SOCIETY] 129 (1983).
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pornography involves posing a child in a suggestive fashion and
in circumstances likely to cause nervousness, shame, and anxi-
ety 103 In most cases, moreover, the production of child pornog-
raphy necessarily involves sexual abuse of children. Sexual abuse
means committing a crime-a clear statement that society con-
siders the harm substantial.
The data from physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, em-
pirical studies, and others-not to mention the intuitive judg-
ment of the general public'°4-all affirm an even stronger
consensus as to the harm caused by pornography participation
than was the situation when the Court decided Ferber States
without child pornography statutes have enacted them; states
with relatively narrow descriptions of the child pornography
offense have expanded their definitions of the crime.10 5 More
child victims are being found; more experts are devoting time to
evaluating the effects of child sex abuse.
Although some people argue that adults also suffer harm
from pornography participation,' °6 there is at best no consensus
"03 This is not to suggest that everyone agrees that Ferber was correctly decided or
that any step taken in defense of children is appropriate. Ferber himself made, for
example, a quite common argument: that only obscene speech should be prohibited from
distribution (with the apparent underlying premise that the actual abuse involved in the
depiction should be handled directly by prosecuting the child sex producer for child sex
abuse). An A.CL.U. response to a law enforcement claim that the child abusers use an
underground computer network to locate and trade victims provides another example of
the absence of unanimity as to the solution to the child pornography problem. Said the
A.C.L.U. representative, "A bill to regulate sexually oriented computer services is an
unwise and unconstitutional effort to terminate services which now permit consenting
adults to communicate privately via home computers about their sexual thoughts and
fantasies." Lawmen Say Child Molesters Use Computer Network, Lincoln (Neb.) Jour-
nal, Oct. 2, 1985, at 32, col. 3.
10 See, e.g., Allen, The War on Children, BmiB ADVOcATE 4 (December 1985);
Child Porn Curb, 72 A.B.A. J. 32 (February 1982); Lawmen Say Child Molesters Use
Computer Network, supra note 103, at 32, col. 3.
"I To demonstrate this reaction, one need only compare the statutes in effect when
Ferber was decided with the statutes listed in this article. See Ferber 458 U.S. at 749
n.2; statutes cited supra note 18. See also, Note, Child Pornography Legislation, 17 J.
FAm,. LAW 505 (1979); Note, supra note 18, at 327
16 See, e.g., A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 299-347. The Report
distinguishes between primary harm, that which is harmful in itself, and secondary harm,
that which leads to harmful consequences. Id. at 304. Generally, pornography is not a
primary harm. Id. at 304-06.
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that consenting adults suffer harm. 1i Even if the potential harm
to the adult or the child participant were equivalent, moreover,
no equivalent compelling state interest is triggered to protect
adults from such harm. Adults are assumed to take care of
themselves in interpersonal relationships and to make voluntary
and knowing choices to participate in pornography production.
Certainly these assumptions do not apply to children. What-
ever the controversy about the nature of the consent of an adult
participant in pornography,108 far less controversy-if, indeed,
any at all-can exist regarding the inability of a young child to
give a truly knowing and voluntary consent.'09 For child por-
nography, moreover, issues about a child's capacity to consent
are compounded by the exploitative relationship out of which
the pornography develops. 110
IV STANLEY V FERBER: WHAT ELSE Is DIFFERENT ABOUT
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY?
By itself, the Ferber conclusion that child pornography causes
substantial harm to a child participant is more than sufficient
to distinguish Stanley and to permit making at-home child por-
107 At least this is true when the pornography, or obscenity, is neither violent nor
degrading and is shared and viewed in private. See, e.g., id. at 335-37. There are those
who argue that even public dissemination of such material should not be sanctioned.
The Supreme Court of the United States does not share this view. See, e.g., Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
116 See, e.g., L. LOVELACE & M. McGRADY, ORDEAL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1980).
119 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[D]uring the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."). The
capacity to consent knowingly is related to the child's age. The younger the child, the
less the ability to make a knowing consent-and the greater the likelihood that a state
will not recogmze any evidence that the consent was knowing. Below a certain age a
conclusive presumption of non-consent operates. In modem statutory rape statutes the
age of conclusive non-consent frequently is around 12. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-2 (West 1982). For the most serious of the sex offenses, rape, the Model Penal
Code put the age of non-consent at under 10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code describes a third degree felony as sexual
intercourse with a child less than 16. Id. § 213.3. Here the conclusive presumption is
that a child under 16 cannot voluntarily consent-or, put another way, the law will not
hear argument that the child voluntarily consented.
110 See Guio, Burgess, & Kelly, Child Victimization: Pornography and Prostitution,
3 J. Ctamm AND JusT. 65 (1980).
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nography possession criminal. Combined with other differences
between child pornography and the Stanley Court's concerns in
evaluating obscemty, the case for distinguishing Ferber becomes
virtually unassailable.
Directly related to the harm to children from sexual activity
and to the compelling state interest in protecting them from that
harm is the fact that most of the activity depicted in child
pornography itself is a cnme-a crime that is enforced and that
public and law enforcement officers alike believe should be
enforced."' If a film depicts actual intercourse with a twelve-
year-old, for example, then actual intercourse must have taken
place" 2 and obviously a substantial state interest exists in pros-
ecuting this crime, whether or not depicted on film.
The legal situation regarding the adult sexual activity de-
picted in Stanley obscenity is substantially different from the
situation regarding child sexual activity Following the lead of
the Model Penal Code," 3 most states no longer make adultery
or fornication criminal and, although slightly less than half the
states still make sodomy a crime,"14 prosecutions are rare outside
" See, e.g., Note, The Porno Plague, Tim BIBLE ADVOCATE 2 (January 1985);
Davidson, supra note 54, at 26.
,,2 Child pornography need not involve actual sexual activity. Most motion pictures
produced by the major motion picture companies are not "hardcore." They portray
sexual intercourse through suggestion rather than on screen commission of the sex act.
In addition, actual sex or even nude scenes may be handled by a double. This, evidently,
is how the nude scenes of the then child actress Brooke Shields were handled in Blue
Lagoon. The nature of the producer and audience of child pornography, particularly
when coupled with the limited production budgets generally available, suggest that the
use of body doubles is unlikely and certainly that simulated sex is not all there is to
child pornography.
,,. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (official Draft & Revised Comments 1962). For an
explanation of the Model Penal Code decision to eliminate adultery and formcation as
crimes, see MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARMS pt. I, 430 (1980). See also Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv 669 (1963). For examples
of state statutes eliminating these offenses, see AR. STAT. ANN. § 34-1209 (1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. ch. 14, 24 (1983).
Even states that retain one or the other of these offenses classify them as minor
crimes. See, e.g., NEB. Rv STAT. § 28-704 (1985) (adultery a class I misdemeanor).
Admittedly I have not canvassed the world, but I know of no modern prosecutions
for adultery or fornication. I suspect if there were any, the media would have trumpeted
them far and wide.
114 Twenty-four states still make sodomy a crime. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 2841, 2847-48 n.1 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
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the context of homosexual activity 115 Indeed, the recent holding
in Bowers v Hardwick' 6 regarding a state's power to proscribe
sexual conduct in private and at home was limited to homosexual
sodomy;1 7 the State assumed that its sodomy statute would be
unconstitutional if applied to marital relations.1
8
Nor did the Hardwick Court conclude that prosecution of
homosexual activity was wise state policy It confined its task to
the question of whether homosexuality was a fundamental right." 9
The four dissenters 120 subscribed to a ringing endorsement of at-
home privacy rights governing "the most intimate aspects of
[citizens'] lives. ,121 Justice Powell, who made the fifth vote
in the majority opimon, wrote separately to suggest that a prison
sentence for the crime of sodomy'2 would constitute cruel and
-" There is no evidence to suggest that prosecutions under these statutes are
pursued. The State in Hardwick admitted that no such prosecution had occurred in
Georgia since "the 1930's or 40's" Id. at 2859 n.l1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The State
also chose not to prosecute Hardwick when his act of sodomy was uncovered. Id. at
2848 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). Hardwick's case went to court at his instigation as a
declaratory judgment action, an unwise choice.
116 See generally id.
"t It is true that in the posture of the case the only litigant before the court was
asserting his right as a homesexual to at-home pnvacy. Id. at 2842-44. Arguably, then,
the Court properly limited itself to the only issue before it. It is naive to believe that
the Court necessarily would have treated the question of sodomy between heterosexuals
and especially married heterosexuals the same way it treated homosexual sodomy.
"' Id. at 2858 n.10. The Court left this question unanswered. Id. at 2842 n.2.
319
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy
between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular,
are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or propriety of
state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that crinrmnalize homosexual
sodomy, or of state court decisions invalidating those laws on state con-
stitutional grounds. The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct
illegal and have done so for a very long time.
Id. at 2843.
' Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
121 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
m I believe Justice Powell's concurrence should be read to say any prison sentence
would fall under the eighth amendment. His language, however, does contain some
ambiguity: "In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct-certainly a sentence of
long duration-would create a serious Eighth Amendment problem." Id. at 2847 (em-
phasis added).
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. 23 Doubtless
he would not find an eighth amendment violation if a prison
sentence were imposed for at-home sodomy of a child.
At the very least, then, the public, prosecutors, and courts per-
ceive adult private consensual sexual activity, even if defined as
crime, in a different light from adult/child or adult-inspired
child sexual activity This difference in perspective easily could
contribute to the Court holding that no privacy entitlement to
view child pornography exists.
More than that, the possession of child pornography by the
child sex abuser evidently demonstrates more than the obvious
conclusion that one who engages in sex with children has a sex
interest focused on children rather than adults. Abusers produce
child pornography in conjunction with their own sexual activi-
ties-much child pornography is home grown'24-and they also
use it to entice or to condition a child to participate in sexual
activity 125
Conditioning occurs by demonstrating that other children
have participated (with the implicit message, that nothing is
wrong with sexual activity if other children do it and have fun,
corroborating the adult's explicit urgings). 126 Using pornography
to entice or to "persuade" is apparently a common tactic: pe-
dophiles almost never use force to get their way 127 For child
pornography possessors, at-home possession serves a purpose
123 Clearly, then, the Hardwick concurrence and dissent demonstrate that the present
Court will not uphold a prison sentence for at-home sodomy. Four dissenters find it
unconstitutional to call at-home sodomy a crime in 1986; Powell thinks it unconstitu-
tional to send anyone to prison for committing the crime.
'24 The underground child pornography market commonly includes the private non-
commercial production and exchange of child pornography. H.R. Rep. No. 536, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 11 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 492,
493, 502 (1985); Davidson, supra note 54, at 27; Lanning & Burgess, supra note 102, at
11; Stack, supra note 88, at 13.
"2 Use of pornography to entice or desensitize children is "significant." A.G. Porn
Report, supra note 3, at 411. See also Hartman, Burgess & Lanning, supra note 21, at
86.
22 U.S. DEP'T. JusTICE, F.B.I., CHID MOLESTINo: A BEHAvioRAL ANALYSIS FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT 61 (1986).
117 See generally G. Wn.SON AND D. Cox, supra note 102, at 51; Belanger & Belcher,
Typology of Sex Rings Exploiting Children, in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEx RINGS 51
(A. Burgess ed. 1984).
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additional to the mere at-home consumption; it is a tool to ease
commission of the abuse.
When characterized as a tool in the commission of the child
abuse crime, the nature of child pornography, as well as the
question whether possession may be made criminal, immediately
takes on a different look. Consideration of the crime of burglary
illustrates this difference. A burglar frequently uses tools to ease
commission of a burglary As a result, in many jurisdictions,
possession of burglar's tools is criminal. 128 Possessing burglar's
tools is a crime, not because these tools are inherently evil, but
because they are used and useful in committing a burglary
Child sexual abuse is also a crime. If the child pornography
product, like the burglar's screwdriver, can be shown to be useful
and perhaps necessary in a pedophile's enticement of a child to
participate in criminal sexual activity, then possession of child
pornography seems to present a case for prosecution equivalent
to the case for prosecution of screwdriver possession. 2 9 If any-
thing, the pornography case is stronger since the harm produced
through use of child pornography is more serious than the harm
produced through use of the screwdriver.
What does Stanley have to say on the subject of making
obscemty possession criminal by analogizing it to the possession
of a burglar's tools? While the Stanley Court did not consider
this use of obscenity directly it is reasonable to assume that the
Court would have continued to limit punishment to only the
doing in the face of a claim that at-home possession of adult
obscenity should be made criminal because it is used to entice
adults into sexual activity It is even more reasonable to assume,
however, that the Stanley Court would not have treated with
similar equanimity a showing that child pornography is used to
entice children into sexual activity 130 The enticed child, after all,
is a qualitatively different victim from the enticed adult.
"I See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-13-8-i (1976); MIcH. CoMP LAWS ANN. § 750.116
(West 1966).
"I' Remember that the content of the child pornography does not receive first
amendment protection. Thus, the pornography and the screwdriver alike are not pro-
tected speech. Whatever protection is to be afforded to child pornography, then, must
come from the Stanley-recognized special privacy interests associated with the home.
M30 Using child pornography to entice a person into sexual activity or to desensitize
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In light of these differences between children and adults,
both in the harm caused to the sex act participant and in societal
interest to protect against the harm, next consider the Stanley
Court's rejection of law enforcement concerns as a sufficient
justification for a possession offense. The argument relating to
prosecution difficulties rests on a state's police power to outlaw
obscemty or child pornography In Stanley, the State argued
that prosecuting possession of obscene materials was necessary
because prosecuting for distribution or intent to distribute was
so difficult that a state could not protect its interest in outlawing
obscemty efficiently or effectively "I1
This argument prompted the Court to respond that it did
not believe that prosecution difficulties existed, and even assum-
ing such difficulties, the right to read or to observe as one wishes
is so fundamental as to override any state entitlement to ease in
administering its criminal laws.132 In the Stanley Court's view,
privacy and independence of thought were values too important
to be sacrificed on the altar of criminal justice efficiency
It equally is true of child pornography that a state can
prosecute a child pornography producer 133 or distributor; 134 either
of these may cause more harm to the child than a mere at-home
consumer In fact, when sexual activity is depicted, the person
who produces the pornography and orchestrates the child's sex-
ual activity probably causes the major harm. 135 That person may
be prosecuted not only for child pornography production but
a person to a particular sexual activity is not unique. Some claim today that, like child
pornography with children, adult pornography is used to get adults to reject their
inhibitions or to pressure them to engage in activity that they othenwise would refuse.
See A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 342. Others argue that when the
pornography is neither violent nor degrading, its use to entice may actually have a
beneficial function in stimulating, enhancing, and perhaps promoting variation of adult
sexual activity.
The difference between the use of child pornography to entice children and the use
of adult obscenity to entice adults, then, is not necessarily in the potential to entice but
in (1) the child's lack of capacity to consent and (2) the fact of (or, depending on the
point of view, the greater) harm caused to the child by the ensuing sexual activity.
"' Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 561-64 (1969).
132 Id.
1 Id. at 567.
"4 This is true only if the child pornography harm that circulation of the depiction
causes is separated from the harm production causes.
" Or at least the clearer harm.
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also for the child abuse or the child sexual abuse that was
photographed.
Because the option of prosecuting producers and distributors
is available, the difficulty of successful prosecution seems to be
no different an argument in the child pornography context than
in the obscenity context and should have as little success. This
conclusion ignores not only the different context in which society
places protection of children but also the increased difficulty of
successful production and distribution (and child abuse) prose-
cutions when child witnesses are involved. 3 6 The more substan-
tial prosecution problems involved with child witnesses or victims
increase the law enforcement costs over those asserted in Stanley
At the same time, the compelling state interest to protect children
and the more severe harm suffered by child pornography partic-
ipants increase the asserted need for greater law enforcement
involvement. The question thus becomes whether law enforce-
ment gains from employing the most pervasive program to pre-
vent harm to children are worth more than the privacy loss. The
Stanley Court never answered this question.
I still have not exhausted the catalogue of real and at least
arguably pertinent differences between child pornography and
the Stanley facts. Consider, as a final example, child abuse
reporting statutes. Generally in the criminal law no legal duty
exists to act to prevent a crime. The lack of legal duty is as
true for an obscenity crime as for any other By contrast,
many jurisdictions today make it a criminal offense to fail
to report a suspected instance of child abuse'37 or child sex
3I For a discussion of child-victim/child-witness prosecution difficulties, see infra
text accompanying notes 174-92.
"I Many of these statutes restnct the mandatory reporting obligation to doctors,
teachers, police officers, and others in a special care relationship. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§§ 26-14-i to -14 (Supp. 1986); Aiz. Rav STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (1986). In others the
definition of child abuse or neglect requires that the acts be caused by a parent or
guardian. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.8 to -8.21 (1976 & Supp. 1986). Some
impose no penalty for failure to report. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-516 to 517,
543 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-205 (1977). An at-home child pornography viewer in
most situations would have no duty to report under these statutes. Nor would he be
likely to have a duty under a statute that requires reporting only physical injury. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 845-846.1 (1985). Other states, however, have reporting
statutes that seem squarely to cover the at-home child pornography viewer. See, e.g.,
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abuse. 3 Several jurisdictions expressly cover child sexual exploita-
tion (defined to include visual depictions) in the list of crimes for
which observers have an affirmative duty to report. '39
The primary purpose of a reporting statute is to facilitate
investigation of and elimination of child abuse. The factual
circumstances contemplated are those in which the reporter is a
concerned citizen who knows either the adult or the child
involved 140 and shares the societal interest in protecting children
from sexual abuse. The statute is directed at catching the pe-
dophile, not at getting the pedophile to report.
Nonetheless, when a pornography viewer knows the adult or
the child depicted or when the viewer has reason to believe that
the child pornography was produced recently in the junsdic-
tion, 141 the typical child pornography viewing situation is differ-
ent from the typical situation contemplated under a reporting
statute only because the pedophile is a bad rather than a con-
cerned citizen. Unless and until child pornography possession is
made criminal, this difference hardly seems a justification for
exclusion from the reporting responsibility 142 Under some re-
porting statutes, then, the viewer arguably commits a crime at
IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1601 to -1602, -1619 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE §§ 31-6-11-1 to 3, 6-
4-3, 35-42-4-1 to -4, 35-45-4-1 (1985).
131 Most jurisdictions include sexual abuse within the ambit of the child reporting
requirement. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-
205 (1977).
"I See, e.g., ARiz. REv STAT. ANN. §§ 8-546,13-3552 to 3553 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO
CODE §§ 16-1602 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE §§ 31-6-11-2, -6-4-3, 39-49-2-1 to -2 (Supp.
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3b-2 (Supp. 1986).
,,0 In any case, many pedophiles do know personally the adult and/or child depicted
on film.
141 Much child pornography is produced outside the United States and transported
in, See infra authorities cited at note 152. A viewer of child pornography might not
have reason to know whether the child pornography was foreign-produced or produced
in another state. Similarly, the child pornography may have been produced several years
earlier and its participants no longer children. Again, the child pornography viewer
might have no reason to know whether the child abuse depicted is recent enough to
oblige the viewer to report. In any case, a state may have less interest, if any at all, in
protecting children not within the state or in protecting participants no longer children.
Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747, 779 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
,42 If possession is made criminal, then the child pornography possessor has a fifth
amendment privilege against the reporting obligation. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Similarly, the possessor
has a privilege if he or she is one of the actors depicted.
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home and in private merely by viewing and then not reporting
what he or she sees in the child pornography
Thus endeth the litany of differences between child pornog-
raphy and obscenity that supports an exemption from Stanley
under the Stanley rationale. The case for distinguishing is made
easy once harm to children is shown. Its constitutionality follows
no matter what the standard of review
V STANDARD OF REVIEW WHAT PRICE PRIVACY 9 WHAT
PRICE CHILDREN 9
The Court has stated that when unprotected speech such as
child pornography is concerned, a state need only show a ra-
tional relationship between the defined harm (here, injury to
children) and the legislative response to deal with that harm.
4
1
In Ginsberg v New York, for example, a state legislative finding
that material not obscene for adults nonetheless impaired "the
ethical and moral development of our youth"' 144 triggered a state
interest sufficient to prohibit sale of the material to children.
On that basis, once harm to children is shown, a statutory
solution will be upheld if it-does not offend a first amendment
(or other constitutionally) protected interest, and it embodies a
solution rationally related to a state's interest in preventing the
harm.
In Ferber, when the question was public distribution and not
Stanley privacy, a rational relationship test was employed to
conclude that child pornography causes harm. 145 Unquestionably
a legislative judgment that possession of child pornography causes
harm passes muster under this test. The at-home possession
crime is rationally related to the protection of children even
without reliance on the intermingled harm caused by the por-
nography enterprise. Examining the combined harm merely rein-
forces the legislative judgment.
Since all nine members of the Ferber Court agree that child
pornography is not protected speech, 146 technically a child por-
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-43 (1968).
" Id. at 641.
141 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58.
"6 Id.
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nography possession crime does not offend first amendment
interests. The only other constitutional derivation for protection
stricter than that provided by a rational relationship test is the
high societal value placed on privacy Except for Stanley, how-
ever, the privacy interest the Court has recognized to date exclu-
sively relates to family, sexual, or marital privacy 147 The home
by itself and unattached to another substantial interest does not
insulate from criminal prosecution harmful activity that occurs
within.
The substantial interest recognized in Stanley was the right to
view obscenity (translated by the Stanley Court into the right to
read and think without government interference). Because child
pornography is distinguishable from Stanley obscenity, arguably
Stanley no more dictates stricter scrutiny of legislative action
regarding at-home child pornography possession than it operates
to preclude the constitutionality of the child pornography pos-
session crime.
Although the Court might follow this approach, it is flawed
by its circularity The reason child pornography differs from
obscenity is because child pornography causes harm. If harm is
the necessary precondition for distinguishing Stanley, then the
Court must focus its scrutiny on the issue that harm is caused.
To accomplish this, I believe the fundamental Stanley right of
privacy should apply until the Court after strict scrutiny affirm-
atively decides that harm is caused.
Classifying at-home child pornography possession as a crime
implicates a first amendment privacy interest. Legislation in-
fringing this interest is constitutional only if the legislation is both
justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to
effect that interest.14 The protection of children unquestionably
is a compelling state interest. The remaining question is whether
a child pornography possession crime statute is narrowly tailored
to protect children. To determine whether it is narrowly tailored
147 See cases cited supra note 10.
i,, See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); U.S. v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938) (holding that where legislation infringes a protected interest
within a "specific prohibition" of the Constitution, strict scrutiny may be required in
considering the constitutionality of the legislation); see also L. LusKy, By WHAT RIGHT?,
108-10 (1975).
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requires a two-part analysis. First, child pornography possession
must cause harm to children. Second, the possession crime must
not pull within its scope persons that the state legitimately can
have no interest in protecting.
In Ferber, a prosecution of a commercial distributor, the
Court looked at data that concluded harm to children was caused
directly and exclusively by child pornography as well as at data
focusing on the harm caused by the child pornography enter-
prise. 149 If anything, this approach makes even more sense with
a possession crime because an at-home possessor seems more
likely than a commercial distributor to use the pornography in
ways, such as enticing children to sexual activity, that involve
the intertwined child pornography enterprise. In any event, such
an approach is appropriate: societal ability to prevent risk to a
child from child pornography should not have to walt on social
science data that may never arnve regarding the harm that the
child pornography depiction exclusively caused.
When all the activities associated with the child pornography
enterprise are considered in evaluating the question of harm to
the child, then the case for demonstrating the causation of the
harm is "evident beyond the need for elaboration. ' ' 5 0 The only
remaimng question is whether the child pornography crime in-
cludes within its ambit those for whom a state may not legislate.
Although much child pornography production is local and non-
commercial, a good portion of child pornography is produced
in another state or outside the Umted States.' That is particu-
larly true of child pornography produced commercially 152
None of the child pornography possession statutes presently
enacted contain express exceptions from culpability for a pos-
"' Ferber 458 U.S. at 757-59.
150 Id. at 756. Even those who suggest that the harm suffered from child sexual
activity is overrated agree that there is harm. But see G. WsoN & D. Cox, supra note
102, at 129. These authors argue, however, that the harm to a child becomes substantial
and longlasting only if family and friends react badly to disclosure or if there is no
prompt therapeutic intervention.
", A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 408-09.
25 Densen-Gerner, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: Medical, Legal, and
Societal Aspects of the Commercial Exploitation of Children, reprinted in NATIONAL
CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, SExuAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READ-
INos (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services publication no. (OHDS) 78-30161 1980);
R. LLOYD, FOR MONEY OR LovE: BoY PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA 89-90 (1976).
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sessor whose child pornography involves an out-of-state 53 child
actor Because a state's interest in protecting child participants
who have no connection to the state arguably may be described
as "far less compelling' '154 than its interest in protecting its own
children, do all these statutes fail as overinclusive?
Traditional standing doctrine prohibits a defendant from
making an on-its-face challenge to a statute when a statute more
narrowly drawn could have proscribed the defendant's con-
duct. 55 The only exception to traditional standing arguably re-
levent to child pornography is one created to provide breathing
space under the first amendment. 56 Even if a defendant can
make such a first amendment challenge where unprotected speech
is involved, 57 overbreadth must be substantial "judged in rela-
tion to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."'5 8
Ferber himself argued that he should be permitted to chal-
lenge the New York statute under which he was convicted as
being substantially overbroad even if validly applied to him. 5 9
The Court answered that New York's statute was a "statute
whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible appli-
cations." ' 60 The same is true of a child pornography possession
statute.
Because child sex abusers frequently produce their own por-
nography and every state has child sex abusers, a substantial
portion of child pornography in every state involves that state's
own children as participants. Even commercial child pornogra-
phy, most of which is produced outside the United States, in-
"' By "out-of-state" child actor, I mean one whose depicted sexual activity took
place outside the state and who has no connection with the state either at the time of
the child pornography production or at. the time of its discovery or prosecution.
"-4 Ferber 458 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring); cf. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982) (state has no interest in protecting non-resident shareholders).
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
Id. at 611.
," But see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
358 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; accord Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 503-04 (1985) ("If the overbreadth is 'substantial, the law may not be enforced
against anyone, including the party before the court, until it is narrowed to reach only
unprotected activity, whether by legislative action or by judicial construction or partial
invalidation.").
"4 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772.
36 Id. at 773.
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cludes a great many pictures of American children contributed
by American pedophiles.1 61 Thus any perceived overbreadth in
statutory scope is insubstantial.
In fact, no overbreadth problem exists at all because a state's
interest properly may encompass protection of out-of-state chil-
dren. To say that a state may protect only its own children from
what it legitimately describes as a clear and severe harm-and
to hell with the rest of the world-seems indescribably parochial
and indifferent to shared national and, for most countries, in-
ternational concerns. In protecting children wherever located,
moreover, a state indirectly protects those children unarguably
entitled to its protection.
First, unlike a child's sex or coloring, a child's connection
to a state is not discernible by looking at the child. In many
cases, certainly most cases involving commercially produced child
pornography, a child's identity will be unknown and undiscov-
erable and so too his or her connection with a particular state.
That being true, a state's clear interest in protecting its own
children may be undermined seriously if successful prosecutions
depend on proving 62 that the child in the child pornography has
a connection with the state (or even on proving that an adult
depicted in the pornography has such a connection).
Second, successful possession prosecutions may work to dry
up the child pornography commercial market. Since the smaller
the market, the fewer the children who will be used to make
child pornography, successful possession prosecutions involving
out-of-state children indirectly achieve protection of those in-
state.
Third, a child pornography possessor does not choose por-
nography based on geographical nexus between a state and the
child portrayed in the pornography The longer it takes to pros-
ecute the possessor, and the harder the proof problems of the
6, See A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 408; S. REP No. 438, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1977).
162 This is the case even if the proof standard on the jurisdictional predicate is
simply a preponderance rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.13(10) (" '[M]aterial element of an offense' means an element that does not
relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter
similarly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense ").
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prosecution, then the longer he or she remains a potential pre-
dator of in-state children.
Finally, it is impossible to imagine that a state would resent
as intrusive a sister-state's help in protecting its children. Were
the assertion of jurisdictional nexus outside a state's power even
with sister state consent, moreover, there IS protection achieved
for in-state children in such a broadly defined state power. In
reciprocally protecting the children of other states, each state
thereby indirectly protects its own.
Making child pornography possession a crime thus is a nar-
rowly tailored effectuation of the state's compelling interest to
protect its children. Whether a rational relationship test or strict
scrutiny test is applied to test the constitutionality of the child
pornography possession crime, the result is the same: the crime
is constitutional.
VI. AN EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM
PROSECUTING AT-HOME POSSESSION
The next consideration is whether making child pornography
possession a crime is worth doing. As the economists say, what
are the costs? And what are the benefits? A cost-benefit analysis1 63
is needed because a child pornography possession crime may
mean a loss of privacy and perhaps a weakemng of the para-
mount principle that a person's private thoughts are his or her
own. A showing that at-home child pornography possession
constitutionally may be made criminal, in other words, is not
necessarily a showing that making it a crime is wise policy
A. Possession as Increasing the Catch
The first task to consider is what activity presently may be
made criminal under Stanley Then evaluating what activity re-
mains that may be reached only by a child pornography poss-
ession offense will be possible.
Obviously production of child pornography is a crime and
remains a crime whether produced in a commercial studio or in
163 For a discussion of the cost-benefit analysis as a slippery slope and its likelihood
here, see infra text accompanying notes 238-47.
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the home. Distribution is a crime even in the absence of a
commercial purpose. Any exchange, no matter how private, may
be made criminal and pumshed. 64 Similarly, any transport out-
side the home, no matter how private or how discreet, 165 may
be prosecuted consistent with the Stanley holding.
Using pornography to entice a child to engage in sexual
activity may be made criminal and prosecuted whether or not
the use took place in the home. Regardless of purpose, any
sharing of child pornography (or obscenity or indecent material)
with a child unquestionably may be prosecuted.es Sharing child
pornography with another adult, even at home, also may be
prosecuted. 167 In fact, if eight pedophiles get together in one of
their homes and each brings pictures, then each may be prose-
cuted for sharing child pornography with the other seven.
Under Stanley, then, the only person who is protected from
criminal treatment is the lone viewer who manages to get the
material to his or her house without being caught. Even when
the material is obscenity and not child pornography, the viewer
is protected only at home and only when he or she does nothing
more than possess and view the material alone and in private.
How many child pornography possessors fit this description
and therefore commit no crime unless child pornography pos-
session is made criminal? I have no precise way of quantifying,
nor have I seen any empirical studies that attempt the analysis.
From all the data demonstrating the congruence between child
pornography and child sex abuse, as well as the data demon-
strating that much child pornography is home produced by the
child sex abuser in conjunction with sexual activity, I cannot
imagine that we are talking about a large number of people.
16
'1' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-192 (Supp. 1986); ARiz. REv STAT. ANN. § 13-
3553 (Supp. 1986); MD. [CgIm. LAw] CODE ANN. § 419A (Supp. 1986).
"I See cases cited supra note 11.
11 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968).
67 The one exception would be a spouse or perhaps a "significant other." Sharing
may be made criminal because it involves more than private thought. The possessor is
now a distributor. Cf. Beach v. State, 411 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. App. 1980) (defendant
"exhibited child porn to another" in defendant's hotel room).
16, 1 am deliberately leaving out of the equation the prosecutorial discretion in
choosing the crimes entitled to office resources in investigation and preparation. Variables
such as budget and court calendar constraints as well as prosecutorial evaluation as to
comparative seriousness of various crimes obviously impact on whether a new crime in
the statute books means more prosecutions.
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Yet, since viewing child pornography causes demonstrable
injury to a child, then preventing even one instance of such child
victimization is worth the cost. Thus the first and clearest po-
tential benefit ascribed to prosecuting at-home possession is that
prosecution of possessors expands the net so as to catch other
perpetrators, however few they are, who may be caught in no
other way
The decrease in child victimization, however, is neither solely
nor primarily dependent on defining possession as criminal. The
key criterion is how many of these new criminals will be caught.
Whatever the supposed gains a possession crime should produce
in conviction rates of possessors, the actual effect will be mim-
mal unless the police somehow are able to develop ways to learn
who is committing the new offense.
Consider the child abuse or the child sex abuse crime. Child
abuse frequently produces evidence physically visible on the child.
Child abuse and child sex abuse both frequently result in iden-
tifiable behavioral changes caused by emotional distress.169 A
child sex abuser acting with children other than his or her own
may create suspicion by the frequency of child visits to the
abuser's home. Yet, even though child physical and sexual abuse
often provide fairly observable indicia of the abuse, perhaps
fewer than six percent of these cases are reported.
1 70
Many explanations are given for the low reporting figures.
Perhaps we all lead such insulated and independent lives that we
never see instances of child abuse. 171 Then again, we may not
169 See J. MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS AND TEm VIcTIms, 120-45 (1971); Com-
ment, supra note 54, at 817-20. This is particularly true of coerced sexual activity. See,
e.g., Halleclk, Emotional Effects of Victimization, in SExuAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW
684 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965); Landis, Experience of 500 Children with Adult Sexual
Deviation, 30 PsYcHIATRiC Q. 100-03 (1956).
11o See Prager, Sexual Psychopathy and Child Molesters: The Experiment Fails, 6
J. Juv L. 49, 62 (1982); Schoettle, supra note 69, at 290; Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse
of Children: Myths, Research, and Policy Implications, 89 DICK. L.REv 691-719 (1985);
see also, De Francics, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults,
35 FED. PROB. 15, 17 (Sept. 1971).
"7 This allegedly is part of the reason why no one who knew the Kallinger family
noticed the child abuse suffered by the child Joseph Kallinger. F SCHInEmER, THE
SHOEMAKER 21-61, 388-95 (1984) (Joseph Kallinger and his 12-year-old son were charged
with break-ins, rapes, and murders committed dunng a seven-week period in 1974. They
also may have been responsible for two additional murders. One of the victims was a
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recognize what we see as abuse, either because of a refusal to
believe our neighbors act in this way or because of an inability
to see the evidence of child abuse for what it is.'72 Finally, we
may fail to report what we see because of a general reluctance
to get involved.
Whatever the explanations for low abuse reporting statistics,
there is no reason to believe that the reporting rate dramatically
will improve for a possession crime. Given the nature of child
pornography possession, neither as directly harmful as actual
abuse nor as productive of observable evidence, I would expect
the reporting statistics to be much worse.
As a result, the possession crime probably will not identify
any new child victimizers. 173 No matter how big the net, after
all, it still must be thrown in water where fish are likely to be
found. The presence of the fish in combination with the size of
the net produces an increase in the catch. The police problem,
even with the expanded net of a child pornography possession
crime, is that the police continue to be unable to locate the fish.
B. Possession as Increasing Convictions
If the possession crime adds little in its own right to the law
enforcement arsenal, it nonetheless may increase the overall con-
viction rate for those already identified as possible child sex
abusers. Because the possession crime involves fewer elements
than, for example, the present crimes of distribution or posses-
sion with intent to distribute or using child pornography to entice
a child, a prosecution for possession may result in a conviction
when the jury would acquit the defendant of the related crime. 74
child of nine or ten and the other victim was Joseph's older son.). Id. at 15-18, 196-
202, 221-32.
172 This also seems to be true of the Kallinger family history. See id. It clearly was
true of Sybil's childhood (Sybil was the multiple personality whose story was made into
a television movie starring Sally Field and Joanne Woodward.). For Sybil's story, see
F SCHRIMBER, SYBir (1973).
"I The one exception is when the police investigate the defendant for another
reason and unexpectedly find the child pornography during the course of that investi-
gation. In Stanley the investigation that turned up the obscenity was initially conducted
to find evidence of illegal bookmaking activities. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557-58
(1969).
,"4 Ease of conviction was considered insufficient justification in Stanley to warrant
an at-home possession prosecution. See supra notes 129-31. The decision was in the
context of adult obscenity. Id. at 567-68.
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The same could hold true in a prosecution for child sex
abuse. As noted earlier, virtually all child sex abusers possess
child pornography Thus a child pornography possession crime
potentially sits in every child sex abuse case. Prosecution for sex
abuse may be difficult not only because of more and more
difficult elements to prove, but also because such a prosecution
invariably involves the additional problems associated with child
witness testimony 175
In the typical possession case the prosecutor will have the
child pornography to introduce into evidence.176 Connecting the
pornography to the defendant will be accomplished through the
testimony of the police officer who seized it. 7 7 By contrast, the
typical child sex abuse prosecution requires the testimony of a
child witness.
One problem with child witness testimony is the difficulty of
getting it: often there is family or child reluctance or outright
refusal to cooperate with law enforcement. Many people even
today see the child more as culprit than as victim. Some parents
would rather protect family reputation or the welfare of the
adult abuser 178 than see a successful prosecution take place.
For these and other reasons, many families would prefer to
keep the child sex abuse quiet and avoid a public trial in which
the shameful happenings in their private lives would be dis-
played. 7 9 A perfectly natural inclination exists not to want one's
," Child witness testimony involves several problems that decrease the chances of
a successful prosecution. See generally, The Child Witness, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 1 (Goodman
ed. 1984); Melton, Sexually Abused Children and the Legal System: Some Policy Rec
ommendations, 13 AM. J. FAm. THERAPy 61 (1985); Libai, supra note 88, at 977; Parker,
The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator? 17 Naw ENO.
L. REv 643 (1982); ABA Nat'l Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protec
tion, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Intrafamily Child Sexual
Abuse Cases (Oct. 1982); ABA Nat'l Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
Protection, Innovations in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases (Nov. 1981).
176 1 am oversimplifying here. In the typical case in which the State has the
pornography one would expect a plea to result-at least once the judge at the suppression
hearing decided that the pornography was constitutionally seized and therefore admissible
into evidence.
I" For a discussion of fourth amendment law regarding presumptive first amend-
ment materials, see infra text accompanying notes 228-35.
7 A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 416-17 n.79.
"79 See Schoettle, supra note 85, at 293 (12-year-old child pornography participant
contemplated suicide after newspaper stones about her participation were published).
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private problems substituting for the entertainment generally
provided by television soap operas. The natural urge for privacy
is compounded by the activities of distributors, producers, and
child sex abusers. They not only operate in private, frequently
by resorting to an underground network, but their common
tactic is to frighten children into not reporting or not cooperating
if the crime is uncovered.'8 0
Even with a reported case and a cooperative child and par-
ents, all problems do not disappear. The child involved may be
so young as not to qualify as a witness'81 or may be unable to
communicate intelligibly or may freeze in the defendant's
presence'82 or may be unwilling to respond to questions put by
the defense counsel or the prosecutor 183 Even with an intelligible
child witness, jurors still may doubt the child's credibility 184
Many of these difficulties have led to making accommoda-
tions for child testimony 185 Yet however helpful a particular
accommodation might be to a child witness, that accommodation
cannot be made if it infringes upon a defendant's sixth amend-
ment confrontation rights.'8 6 When special child witness proce-
dures are employed, moreover, they cannot assure that all
problems with child witnesses magically will disappear
11o See generally, CHILD PORNOGPRAPHY AD SEX RINGS (A Burgess ed. 1984).
'' See, e.g., Prager, supra note 170, at 49.
See, e.g., State v. Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575 (Neb. 1986) (ruling that closed-
circuit television could not be used without "compelling need"). See also Note, The
Constitutionality of Admitting the Videotape Testimony at Trial of Sexually Abused
Children, 7 WnTrER L. REv. 639, 639 n.1 (1985).
" See, e.g., Warford, 389 N.W.2d at 575.
,, Goodman, Golding, & Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40 J. Soc.
Issuas 139 (1984).
S Accomodation for children has included an abused child hearsay exception. See,
e.g., COLO. REv STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp.
1986); WASi. REv CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1985). Some states provide for video-
taped child witness testimony. See, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2036 (Supp.
1983); COLO. REv STAT. § 18-3-413 (Supp. 1986); Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 421.350
(Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (Supp. 1986). Another accomodation is taking
child witness testimony in camera (watched on video by the jury). See, e.g., ABA Nat'l
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, Recommendations for Im-
proving Legal Intervention in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, Rec. 3.3 (1982).
Some states have eliminated corroboration reqmrements for child witness testimony. See
id., Rec. 4.2. Finally, a child courtroom has been proposed. Libai, supra note 88, at
977.
"6 See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (hearsay exception did not deny
confrontation right).
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At the very least, preparation of an abuse case involving a
child witness takes longer than the average case. Several inter-
views frequently are necessary before the child feels comfortable
talking with the prosecutor 187 Attempts are made to demystify
the trial process (and thus stimulate testimony) by introducing
the child to the courtroom, judge, and court officers, sitting the
child in the witness chair, and letting the child observe court
proceedings. All this takes time.
In addition to the practical difficulties with young child
witnesses, some question whether the testimony should be at-
tempted at all. There are experts who say that in all sex or
physical abuse cases, the trial process, with potential appearances
at grand jury and preliminary hearing stages and the likelihood
of repeated interviews to prepare the case for trial, is harmful
to a child since it keeps the abusive episode current in the child's
memory 188 Others argue that while harm can occur, it typically
comes in an incest case in which testimony places the child in a
difficult emotional position.'
8 9
Although experts may differ as to whether and when such
harm from testimony can be predicted and whether and when it
117 Frequently particular prosecutors are designated to work with children as not
all adults are equally facile at establishing a relationship with a child in which the child
will feel at ease to talk, much less talk about private or embarassing subjects.
Prosecuting child molesters has been called "one of the toughest and most stressful
[jobs] in law enforcement." Grueling Child-Abuse Cases Push Many Prosecutors to
Their Limits, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1986, at 31, col. 4.
-88 Some believe the damage is so great that children should not testify. Others
believe, however, that no empirical case has been made that children need any special
trial accommodation at all. See, e.g., T. GIaBENS & J. PRINCE, CImLD VIcTas OF Sax
OFFENSES (1963). Some even argue that the testimony serves as a purgative and a
catharsis. See, e.g., Melton, supra note 175, at 64-65.
Yet another harm also arguably ensues from child testimony. This is the risk of a
jury acquittal and its effect on a child. The proof burden in a criminal case means,
obviously, that a jury could believe a defendant likely guilty and yet still acquit because
of a remaining reasonable doubt. Acquittal necessarily means neither juror belief in the
defendant's innocence nor juror belief that the child lied. Disinterested adults have
enough trouble understanding this distinction: a complaining witness, whether child or
adult, is much less able to appreciate the distinction.
189 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 175, at 643. The child may have mixed feelings
about the adult and may feel guilt at the perceived responsibility for possibly breaking
up the home. The guilt may be accentuated by family unhappiness at the trial and at
the family breakdown. See, e.g., Burgess, Hartman, McCausland, & Powers, Impact of
Child Pornography and Sex Rings on Child Victims and Their Families, in CHmD
PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RiNGs (A. Burgess ed. 1984).
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can be avoided by special trial accommodation, 190 one thing is
clear: if the trial judge concludes that testifying will be harmful
to the child, then the child will not testify Punishment of the
adult will be a consideration secondary to prevention of addi-
tional harm to the child. 191
When a child sex abuse prosecution is lost because of child
witness problems, a prosecution for the imbedded possession
crime might succeed. How many more child abusers will be
caught through conviction in such a surrogate prosecution de-
pends on how many presently get away 192
Unlike the specious argument that a child pornography pos-
session crime results in more convictions simply because there
now are more criminals, THIS number of convictions, whatever
it turns out to be, is a societal benefit directly attributable to
the possession crime. The number is a net gain because it is not
dependent on locating new abusers. Rather, the surrogate pros-
ecution enhances the likelihood of convicting a child abuser who
already has been located and identified. -
C. Effect of Possession Conviction on Next Prosecution
Next consider the possible effect of a successful surrogate
190 Research methodology is imprecise for assessing degree and duration of harm.
See, e.g., The Child Witness, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 1 (Goodman ed. 1984); Libai, supra
note 88, at 977; Melton, supra note 154, at 61. There are several sources for the harm-
the abusive episode itself, the delay in theurapeutic intervention, inappropriate family
and official response, and the trial process. Obviously, then, it is difficult if not
impossible to isolate how much harm is caused by any one of the factors. This difficulty
is exacerbated by different combinations of factors leading to different conclusions
regarding contribution to total harm caused by each separately.
M" I do not mean to suggest that a consensus exists as to the harm to the child
from courtroom testimony-or to what is sufficient to eliminate, or at least alleviate,
the harm. I merely suggest that if a judge is convinced by expert testimony that the
injury to the child will be great, the judge will not permit the testimony. Similarly, if a
prosecutor is convinced that testimony will be damaging to the child, he or she may
elect not to go forward with the case-or look to bring the case without the child's
testimony. And, for that matter, if a parent is convinced that his child will be harmed
by testifying the parent may make it very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the
child's testimony.
19, It also depends on how many times child witness problems lead a prosecutor
either not to prosecute or to take a plea on a minor related offense and how many
times these cases, if tried, result in acquittal.
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prosecution' 93 in a later child sex abuse case 94 involving the same
defendant.195 Many criminals recidivate. Prime among recidivists
are child sex abusers. 96 The surrogate possession conviction of
the abuser who otherwise might have gotten away should mean
an easier conviction and a heavier sentence for the abuser if he
or she subsequently is convicted for the "right" crime.
1. Repeat or Habitual Offenders
No matter whether the sentencing system is indeterminant,
determinant, or presumptive, a repeat offender is treated more
severely than a first-time offender committing the same offense.
Most states now have habitual offender statutes that permit both
enhanced sentencing for a repeat offender and specify just what
that enhanced sentence must be. 9 7
,9 The discussion regarding the NEXT crime is also applicable to a two-count
prosecution joimng both child pornography possession and child sex abuse charges. To
the extent both charges are before the jury, the child pornography possession charge
may enhance the child's credibility in the abuse case. Similarly, if the evidence of child
pornography possession is to go before the jury anyway, then the second charge is less
helpful to bolster the child's testimony. The charge still may be useful in making evidence
relevant at the trial that otherwise might be inadmissible. Although admissible only on
the child pornography charge, it nonetheless may influence jury consideration of the
child abuse charge. I do not say that this should happen, only that it may.
114 This may also apply to a later child pornography production or distribution
case.
193 To keep things simple, I focus here on the child sex abuser (and not on other
child victimizers such as the child pornography distributor or possessor) who would have
gotten away absent a possession crime. The discussion may apply to these prosecutions
as well.
i16Among the mentally disturbed, the recidivist rate for child sex abusers is exceeded
only by the recidivist rate for exhibitionists. American Psychiatric Association, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 271 (3d ed. 1980).
197 See, e.g., NEB. REV STAT. § 29-2221 (1985); W VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (Supp.
1986). Some commentators argue that judges impose sentences too lenient for crimes
against children. See, e.g., A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 416-17 n.79. In
more than 20 of the states, however, the legislature in the habitual offender statute
mandates a stiffer sentence for the convicted habitual offender. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §
13A-5-9 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 35.50-2-8 (Burns Supp. 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
70.06 (McKinney 1975). Thus, in these states the pedophile convicted as an habitual
offender may not have his sentence lessened by a sentencing judge unconvinced of the
seriousness of the crime or influenced by the respectable look of the offender.
Approximately five states provide habitual offender treatment for misdemeanants.
E.g., Nay REV STAT. § 207.010 (1985); WASH. REv CODE § 9.92.090 (1984). The rest
require that the prior and current crimes be felonies to trigger enhanced sentencing.
E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975); COLO. Ray STAT. § 16-13-101 (Supp. 1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Burns Supp. 1986). This is likely to be no impediment: juris-
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The risk of enhanced sentences for repeat offenses-and the
deterrence that facing this risk might provide' 9 -does not make
the child pornography possession offense unique. The difference,
if there is one, is that without the possession offense used as a
surrogate for the child .sex abuse crime there may never have
been a repeat offender. 99
When the offender is a child sex abuser as well as a child
pornography possessor, moreover, the impact of the prior pos-
session conviction might not stop with enhanced sentencing.
Among other things, 2°° there may be evidentiary consequences
of benefit to a prosecutor.
2. Child Pornography-but No Child Pornography
Conviction
Before considering the possible evidentiary consequences of
a child pornography possession conviction, I want first to con-
sider what could happen at a child sex abuse trial of a defendant
with no prior convictions. Let me return to seven-year-old Ida
Innocent.
Suppose Ida accuses Peter Predator of rape (here defined as
sexual penetration of a child under 13). Ida describes Peter as
having spent several weeks getting to know her, buying her
candy, and generally being friendly She recounts three after-
noons that she spent with Peter in his apartment. On all three
occasions, she tells the.prosecutor, Peter showed her pictures of
a young girl having intercourse with him. On Ida's second and
third visits, Peter suggested that they do what the girl and he
dictions with the child pornography possession offense generally classify it as a felony.
See statutes cited supra note 18. Jurisdictions adding the child pornography possession
offense likely also will classify it as a felony.
M9 Enhanced sentencing also applies to the recidivist child pornography possessor
who is not a child sex abuser. Realization of the heavy sentence risk might deter him or
her from continued consumption and, if enough possessors are convicted, might even
have an effect on child pornography sales, thereby reducing the total amount of child
pornography produced.
I" Any offense containing lesser related or included crimes easier to prove should
result in conviction of an offender who otherwise may never have been convicted the
first time.
"I There also are law enforcement investigative consequences. See infra text accom-
panying notes 225-40.
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were doing in the pictures. On her third and last visit, Ida agreed.
Assume the prosecutor obtains these pictures legally Under pres-
ent operation of the rules of evidence, can the prosecutor intro-
duce the pictures into evidence in Peter's rape prosecution?
The general rule, of course, is that prior bad acts, whether
or not resulting in a criminal conviction, are inadmissible to
show that the defendant committed the act currently being pros-
ecuted. 20 1 Clearly the pictures of Peter with a child other than
Ida may not be introduced to prove that Peter had intercourse
with Ida.
In the above hypothetical, however, introduction of the pic-
tures is relevant to the description of how Peter committed the
sexual abuse of Ida.202 They tend to show how THIS crime was
committed, not that a person who did it before would do it
again. Unquestionably, then, the jury should have both Ida's
testimony AND the pictures in deciding whether Peter sexually
abused her
Now consider a second version of the hypothetical. The
history of Ida and Peter remains basically as described above.
The only difference is that the pictures shown to Ida by Peter
are of a girl and an adult male-not Peter Any change in
result? I think not.
Introducing these pictures would be less prejudicial to Peter
because they do not constitute evidence of Peter's prior bad act.
The pictures are just as relevant, however, to showing how Peter
achieved the sexual abuse of Ida. The trial judge who permits
introduction of the pictures of Peter in the first version of the
hypothetical logically must permit introduction of these pictures,
too.
Move on to a third version of the hypothetical. Once again,
Peter seduces Ida, and the rape prosecution ensues. Pictures are
found, and again I assume they were found legally As in the
first version of the hypothetical, the pictures are of a young girl
201 See, e.g., FED. R. EvIn. 404.
m On these facts there is no question that the possession of the child pornography
is relevant since it has at least a "tendency" to prove the matter in issue. See FED. R.
Evm. 401 advisory committee's note. The general rule is that all relevant evidence is
admissible. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 402. It may be kept out only if "its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." See FED. R. Evin. 403.
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and Peter having sexual intercourse. But unlike that first version,
there was no use of the pictures in Ida's seduction. Introduction
of the pictures this time is not relevant to show how the crime
was committed because the pictures were not involved in the
crime. May this evidence of prior bad acts nonetheless have
substantive use to show Peter's intent to molest Ida? The clear
answer this time is that the pictures may not be introduced
because they are relevant to prove intent only if used to show
Peter's predisposition to molest little girls. That use is an im-
permissible back door attempt to show that a person who abused
a child once is likely to have done it this time.
The same result should hold true if, in yet another version
of my hypothetical, the pictures not only were not used in Ida's
seduction but the adult male in the pictures was not Peter.
Again, this is a clear case in which no evidentiary theory could
lead to the proper substantive admission of the pictures.
203
Assume that the pictures are ruled inadmissible substantively
in these last two versions. The trial begins. Ida tells her story
Peter then takes the stand and demes knowing Ida or raping
her. So far he creates no problem for himself with his testi-
mony,24 but he does not stop here. He also demes any interest
in child sex, saying he finds the very idea of such a thing an
abomnation. Now what about the pictures? The likely answer
is that Peter has "opened the door" to introduction of the
201 I suggest here, however, not that trial judges never will decide this way but that
the evidence rules clearly do not permit it. The ultimate determination of admissibility
rests in the reasoned exercise of discretion by the trial judge. E.g., State v. Ellis, 303
N.W.2d 741 (1981) (in murder prosecution evidence of other assaults on women relevant
to identity and plan). To the chagrin of many evidence professors, I am sure that at
least some judges would decide that these pictures were admissible to show intent and
not be reversed on appeal either because the reviewing court adheres to the same mistaken
view of the admissibility of the pictures or because their admission is considered harmless
error.
21 But see, e.g., People v. Rassmussen, 492 N.E.2d 612, 618-19 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986). In Rassmussen the court upheld the use of a photograph to impeach the defendant
on his claims that he neither sexually assaulted nor even met the victim until after the
day on which the assault allegedly occurred. The photograph used to impeach showed
the victim and a defendant witness-but not the defendant. It was connected to the
defendant (sufficient at least for admissibility) by an equivocal defendant statement
acknowledging awareness of the circumstances of the picture. Other photographs depicted
the defendant in the nude.
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pictures. 205 Once again, then, the evidence is before the jury,
although this time not substantively but to impeach Peter's
testimony
Let me return to Peter on the stand. Suppose that Peter is
silent on the subject of his sexual proclivities. Nor does he
pronounce moral indignation from the witness chair. Instead,
Peter says that he is a responsible, upstanding adult who never
before has been in trouble with the law 206 Would this statement
be enough to trigger introduction of the photographs?
Can defense character witnesses who testify to Peter's repu-
tation as a worthy, moral, and upright citizen open the door to
admission of the photographs? Can other defense witnesses who
claim personal knowledge in denying either the defendant's pres-
ence or his charged activity with the victim open the door
9 207
Can the door be opened by the prosecutor setting Peter up by
the questions he asks on cross-examnation? 20 What are the
answers? Under a pure version of the evidence rules, the answer
is probably no. For some judges, some of the time, the answer
is perhaps yes.
209
What, then, may be concluded from this brief review of
general evidence concepts? In child sex abuse cases in which
child pornography was used to entice, the child pornography, if
found, will be introduced in evidence. If the experts are correct
that most child sex abusers use child pornography to entice, then
20 See, e.g., id. at 617-19.
20 Assume here that, before the Ida incident, he had never been arrested.
2w See, e.g., Rassmussen, 492 N.E.2d at 618-19.
20 In evidence law it is sometimes important whether the testimony that opened
the door was elicited on direct or cross. A further refinement of the textual discussion
thus is needed if Peter's pertinent statements came in answer to questions from the
prosecutor. The prosecutor may not begin by asking Peter if he owns child pornography
since this is what we assumed the judge already ruled on. Can the prosecutor ask Peter
about his feelings regarding child sex abuse? Can the prosecutor ask Peter if he has a
sexual interest in little girls? (And then, once Peter testifies that he has no interest in
little girls and that the crime is an abomination, can the prosecutor then introduce the
pictures?) The answers depend on the jurisdiction, on the trial judge, on the particular
wording of the question, and on how many similar questions are asked. The more it
looks as though the prosecutor merely is circumventing the judge's ruling on picture
inadmissibility, the less likely it is that the questions (or the pictures to impeach) will be
allowed in evidence.
219 For one of the more famous examples of a broad view of the prosecutor's
power to impeach see People v. Sorge, 93 N.E.2d 637 (N.Y. 1950).
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the pornography will be introduced in virtually every one of
these cases. 210 In most other sex abuse cases, the closer the trial
judge attempts to follow the theoretical underpinnings of the
evidence rules, the narrower the scope for introducing the pic-
tures, whether for substantive or impeachment purposes.
3. Child Pornography Conviction: Use to Impeach
A child pornography possession conviction would allow evi-
dence of a defendant's contact with child pornography to be put
before the jury in a subsequent sexual abuse case (if the defen-
dant testifies) in which child pornography either was not used to
entice the child victim or was used but not found. A child sex
abuser is a consumer of child pornography One would expect
that often the pornography will be found. 21' Merely because the
child sex abuser likes and owns child pornography, however,
does not mean the police always will find it. Nor does it neces-
sarily mean that the police may search for it in investigating a
child sex abuse case. 212 While child sex abuse and child pornog-
raphy seem to form an unholy alliance, that does not mean the
alliance will be present for proof purposes in a particular trial.
In all but nine states213 and in federal trials, a cross examiner
may impeach a witness's testimony through use of a prior felony
conviction although, as with a child pornography conviction, the
prior crime involves neither dishonesty nor false statements.2 4 In
210 It therefore seems possible to test empirically the expert conclusions that child
pornography is used to entice by exanumng the number of sex abuse prosecutions in
which child pornography was introduced into evidence as relevant to the way the crime
is committed. I do not know how successful such a study would prove: if the pornog-
raphy is clearly admissible substantively the defendant very well might plead. In any
event, I have not undertaken such a study.
21 See Photos Seized in Sex Abuse Case, Das MonqEs RG., Nov. 8, 1986, at col.
2.
232 See infra text accompanying notes 225-37.
233 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. EviD. CODE § 90.610 (West Supp. 1976); HAW R.
Evm. 609 (1980); ID. R. Evm. 609 (1985).
214 For a bnef descnption of the historical context out of which the rule permitting
impeachment by prior convictions developed, see J. WEINsTEiN & M. BERGER, 3 WEIN-
sTEiN's EVIDENCE, 609-54 to 55.
Perjury is the best example of a pnor conviction with relevance to dishonesty or
false statement. In many jurisdictions theft offenses as a group are treated as relevant
to dishonesty. Id. at 609-72 to -73.
1987-881
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
nearly twenty of these states impeachment use is allowed regardless
of the conviction's probative value or prejudicial effect.21 5 Thus
in these latter states a defendant's prior child pornography as-
sociation probably will be put before the jury should he or she
testify
For federal trials and for states following the federal ap-
proach, impeachment use of a child pornography conviction
requires a showing that probative value outweighs prejudicial
effect to the defendant. 2 6 Under such a required showing, the
child pornography conviction should be inadmissible to impeach
because it has at best little probative bearing on the truthfulness
of the defendant's testimony while its similarity to the present
crime undoubtedly will be quite prejudicial.
217
Admitting the child pornography conviction to impeach a
testifying defendant's credibility would put before the jury the
fact that he or she has an interest in child sex. This is powerful
evidence in a sex abuse case and would buttress any doubts as
to the child's testimony or any concern that a conviction is based
only on the word of a child. 218
"I Nearly 20 states do not require a showing that probative value outweighs
prejudiciality. See, e.g., ARc. STAT. ANN. § 28-100 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-145 (West 1986); NEB. REV STAT. § 27-609 (1978); NEv REV STAT. §.50.095
(1981). Approximately five of these statutes do not require a felony to impeach. See,
e.g., Mo. REv STAT. § 491.050 (1971); OR. REV STAT., § 40.355 (1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 906.09 (West Supp. 1979).
216 FED. R. Evw. 609; see, e.g., Aiz. R. EvlD. 609; ME. R. EVl. 609; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2609 (West 1978).
217 In determimng whether probative value outweighs prejudice, a court probably
will look at the nature of the offense (and this one bears not the slightest relationship
to honesty), remoteness of the conviction (all other factors being equal, the closer the
time proximity, the more likely its admissibility) as well as the similarity of the prior
offense to the charged offense and the importance of credibility issues in the current
trial. 3 D. LouisELL AND C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 315-18, 324-32.
While I know how this balancing test should be answered, I offer no guarantees
that it will be answered this way. In New Jersey, for example, the rule on admissibility
of prior offenses requires a showing that probative value outweigh prejudice. N.J. STAT.
ANN. §,2A:81-12 (West 1976); State v. Sands, 386 A.2d 378 (1978). But even so, I know
of many trial judges who routinely would permit introduction in evidence of a child
pornography possession conviction in a child sex abusg case on the theory that one who
committed a crime is less believable than one who has not.
218 Yes, I understand that impeachment use is NOT use as substantive evidence.
Like many others I believe, however, that a jury would consider substantively the
evidence of a prior child pornography conviction. See Note, To Take the Stand or Not
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Return once again to Ida and Peter Assume that Peter is a
physician and a member of the Chamber of Commerce. 2 9 He
makes a very good and believable witness. Ida, by contrast, is
nervous and fidgety and easily confused as to the sequence of
events. At trial all twelve jurors may be convinced on the sole
basis of Ida's testimony that Peter raped her 220 In this event,
the introduction of Peter's prior child pornography conviction
to impeach his testimony will not move the jury from acquittal
to conviction because the jury was prepared to convict anyway
But suppose one or more of the jurors was not quite convinced
on the basis of Ida's testimony In such a case knowledge of
Peter's prior conviction for child pornography possession might
remove any lingering doubt and turn this hung or acquitting
jury into a convicting jury
Knowing this, Peter might not testify 221 While the jury will
be admonished that the defendant's failure to testify may not
be used to infer guilt-and while a jury actually may follow this
instruction-in at least some cases the defense will be under-
mined by the defendant's failure to explain the circumstances of
his encounter with the child. If, for example, we suppose the
most common situation, that the defendant is a family friend or
relative or someone else who cannot deny knowing the child,
to Take the Stand. The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 COLum.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215, 218 (1968) (response to survey showed more than 40 percent of
judges and almost all attorneys believed jury cannot follow instruction to use prior
conviction only to evaluate credibility).
The general view that juries treat this information substantively is one reason why
the drafters of the federal rules elected to restrict the list of impeaching felonies. J.
WEisTErN & M. BERGER, supra note 214, at 609-56 to 58. The low probative value of
convictions for crimes unrelated to dishonesty is the other major reason why the federal
rules restrict the list of impeacung felonies, Id. at 609-56.
219 Pedophiles come from all walks of life. Frequently they are professionals. They
infrequently salivate or otherwise announce their perversion to the community. See, e.g.,
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RiNGs (A. Burgess ed. 1984); G. WILSON AND D. Cox,
supra note 102, at 15-17; Groth, Patterns of Sexual Assault Against Children and
Adolescents, in SExUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1978).
mo I know I am oversimplifying here. A juror votes to convict if no reasonable
doubt remains on the basis of all the evidence. The question is whether the quantum is
sufficient, not whether each piece of evidence independently meets this standard. For
purposes of streamlined discussion, and also because it likely will be Ida's testimony
that convinces the jury, I am oversimplifying in the text.
' 3 D. LOUISELL AND C. MUELLER, supra note 217, § 315, 317-18. See generally,
Note, supra note 218, at 218.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
then his failure to offer his explanation or denial may well doom
his defense.
My point here is modest. Given the circumstances of Ida
and Peter, many jurisdictions will permit the prosecutor to use
Peter's prior possession conviction to impeach. In these jurisdic-
tions, such use of the prior conviction may make at least some
child sex abuse cases easier to prove.
D Limited Prosecution Benefits
The "real" difficulty impeding an effective criminal law
solution to the problem of child pornography and child sexual
abuse is that relatively few of these crimes ever get reported.
Solutions to the problem that involve creating new crimes are
therefore of limited utility The problem is finding the child
abuser, not simply describing the abuser's conduct as criminal.
Even were this not so, the only at-home conduct presently
protected under Stanley is that of the lone viewer who does
nothing more than privately possess and view Because every-
thing else involving sex or pornography with children already is
or may be made a crime, only a small number of child pornog-
raphy possessors cannot be prosecuted for one or more of these
other crimes.
Creation of a possession offense, however, will permit suc-
cessful prosecution of some child abusers who otherwise would
walk simply because of prosecution proof difficulties. As an
alternative offering increased chance of conviction, the posses-
sion offense will aid the all-out societal effort to punish at least
all known child abusers.
An additional benefit may be derived from the subsequent
use of the conviction obtained in a child pornography surrogate
prosecution. The benefit depends on whether in a particular case
the child pornography possession evidence otherwise is admissi-
ble and whether, in any event, the jurisdiction permits use of
this type of conviction to impeach.
Prosecutors will derive some benefit, but not much, from a
child pornography possession crime.222 The great majority of
22 Some of the benefit derives from the jury's impermissible substantive use of the
child pornography conviction.
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cases still will not be prosecuted because the great majority of
cases still will go unreported.
VII. AN EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL COSTS FROM PROSECUTING
AT-HOME POSSESSION
The two prime costs attributed to making at-home child
pornography possession a crime both relate to the high value
deservedly placed on privacy interests, particularly in one's home.
The first cost is the risk to privacy through new and increased
law enforcement activity attendant on classifying possession as
a crime. The second is the fear that a child pornography excep-
tion will engulf the remainder of the Stanley rule.
A. Privacy Loss Through Vigorous (Or Excessive) Law
Enforcement
I do not know the likelihood that bad arrests or searches
will occur or occur frequently if possession of child pornography
is made a crime. My instinct is that the police will be too busy
with other matters to spend much time looking under beds
(literally) to ferret out suspected possessors of child pornogra-
phy Certainly the police are not presently engaged in such
activity regarding the more senous child sex abuse or child
pornography production crimes. 223 If the police sit merely as
receivers, and then verifiers, of reports or suspicions that others
provide, then any extra enforcement power will make little dif-
ference in present police activity or citizen/police involvement.
Whether or not arrests and convictions abound, the specter
of too much police/citizen involvement exists and perhaps may
by itself override incremental law enforcement benefits derived
from a child pornography possesson crime. The specter gains
more substance when one remembers that the Supreme Court of
the United States has had limited success defining obscemty224
and refused even to try to define child pornography
11 See, e.g., Effect of Pornography on Women and Children: Hearings on S. 1267
Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note I,
at 139-40 (statement of Daniel S. Campagna); Shouvlin, supra note 83, at 543 n.59.
224 Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 .(1957) with Miller v. California,
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Definitional fuzziness lends itself to police mistakes or over-
reaching since the conclusion that the material is child por-
nography is crucial to deciding that possession of the material
is criminal. A citizen lawfully may possess photographs, films,
and books and need not justify to the government particular
taste in reading or viewing material. A crime with defimtional
fuzziness, however, expands the opportunities of the police to
investigate in legal good faith.
Return to my earlier example of the burglar's tools. If the
police conduct a home search for burglar's tools, they can define
with fair precision what objects they expect to find. Not only
can they be concrete in specifying the objects of their search,
but their search for those objects will not involve a rummaging
through private papers, photographs, or film.225
A picture of a nude child, however, is only that until a
content judgment declares it child pornography 226 If it is not
child pornography, it is protected speech. Thus the intrusion to
seize the picture might be an intrusion not only on a fourth
amendment privacy interest but also on a protected first amend-
ment interest as well.
This extra level of analysis necessary to decide whether pos-
session of a picture is criminal likely had great influence on the
Stanley result. Protection of at-home privacy is not only or
merely to protect an adult's right to view obscemty but to protect
the right to be free from intrusion when the material is not
obscene. Limiting a state's ability to declare conduct a crime
concomitantly limits its investigative opportunities.
The at-home privacy interest in first amendment material
should have led to a difference in the standard of cause required
413 U.S. 15 (1973). Mr. Justice Stewart finds articulation of a standard difficult, but
he knows obscenity when he sees it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Brennan finally gave up trying to articulate one
workable standard. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114 (1972) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
- Even unexposed film is seizable when unexposed pictures are within the definition
of child pornography. Several states so define the crime. E.g., CRuM. CODE § 1021.2
(Supp. 1985).
22 See Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, 799 F.2d 1000, 1004 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (nude
photographs of children, including one with frontal nudity of boy and nude girl facing
him, not child pornography under Ferber).
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before a search warrant issues for such material. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court of the United States concluded otherwise.
227
With one exception only, the protection against searching for
presumptive first amendment material is no different from the
protection afforded a burglar's tool.
In fourth amendment law the police sometimes may conduct
a warrantless search on probable cause even if they had time
first to obtain a warrant.28 To search a private dwelling for
evidence 229 of a criminal offense, 230 however, they normally must
have obtained either a search or an arrest warrant.23'
Presumptive first amendment interests, in and out of the
home, always232 are protected by the requirement that a search
21 New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
2n In several situations, a warrant is not required to conduct a search. See, e.g.,
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (public arrest); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of car). For searches of material presumptively covered by
the first amendment, exceptions to the warrant requirement, if available at all, will be
scrutinized closely. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
219 The mere evidence rule no longer limits a fourth amendment search. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The rule permitted searches for contraband or instrumen-
talities or fruits of a crime-but not mere evidence. Id. But even if it still operated to
limit searches, a search for child pornography is a search for an instrumentality of the
crime of possession and not merely a search for evidence of its commission.
If the crime charged is child sexual abuse, then a search for child pornography
would be permitted so long as the pornography was used to entice the child. In this
case, the pornography would be an instrumentality of the crime. I think it unlikely that
a search for child pornography could be conducted on the theory that it is evidence of
the crime of child sexual abuse simply on the premise that child abusers keep child
pornography. I think the constitutionality of a search on this basis is doubtful even if
the child pornography, if found, could be introduced into evidence.
2" By its terms the fourth amendment is not restricted to felomes. State statutes
governing the issuance of search warrants similarly permit warrants to issue whether the
offense is a felony or misdemeanor. See, e.g., NEB. REv STAT. §§ 29-104, -108, and
813 (1985). Nonetheless, most if not all searches today are conducted in conjunction
with felony investigations. It would take a highly unusual case to intrude on at-home
privacy in investigating an offense which, by misdemeanor classification, is not consid-
ered very serious.
211 Alternatively, they must be able to show an exigent circumstance obviating the
need for prior judicial authorization. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
The exigent circumstance justifies the warrantless search if the court in evaluating the
constitutionality of the search is persuaded of the exigency. The need to justify the
warrantless search occurs only when a warrant otherwise is required under the fourth
amendment. In a situation in which a warrant is not required, no exigent circumstance
is needed.
212 At least this is the case in the absence of a "now or never" emergency. Roaden
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be on a warrant. 233 But what the first amendment does NOT
require is a higher or different showing of probable cause before
a warrant issues. Material afforded presumptive first amendment
protection is evaluated by the same standard that governs search
warrants generally "234 the magistrate simply must have a substan-
tial basis for concluding that a fair probability exists that evi-
dence of the crime will be found in the place specified.2Y5
If the police decide to go all out to stop child pornography
possession, the potential for harassment certainly exists. Gay
bars in a commumty tend to be known by the police. If the
police suspect that pedophiles generally are gay, 236 then they
could follow gays home and set up other kinds of surveillance
to find out whether they harbor an unhealthy interest in children.
Similarly, the police might investigate video shops suspected of
behind-the-counter transactions in child pornography237 and be-
gin investigations of all customers or of those customers known
or suspected to have rented child pornography
In fact, however, the police already may undertake this sort
of activity to investigate child sex abuse or child pornography
distribution or to develop a charge that an individual uses child
pornography to entice child victims. I am fairly convinced that
the incremental authority to investigate a possession crime will
have negligible impact.
v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). Compare Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)
(magistrate could issue warrant upon his opinion that the material is obscene) with Marcus
v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (police officer could not search for "obscene"
material without granting defendants a hearing).
13 Roaden, 423 U.S. at 496; see Heller 413 U.S. at 483 (magistrate could issue
warrant but post-seizure hearing still necessary); Marcus, 367 U.S. at 717; see also
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (seizure by customs
agents pursuant to civil process must be followed by prompt post-seizure hearing).
New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986).
235 Id.
236 There are both heterosexual and homosexual pedophiles. See G. WILSON AND
D. Cox, supra note 102, at 123. There are various estimates of pedophilic sexual
preferences. One survey concluded that approximately 70 percent of pedophiles preferred
boys. Another estimate, however, was that child pornography preferences are evenly
split between boys and girls. Comment, Preying on Playgrounds: The Sexploitation of
Children in Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPniRDI L. REv 809, 813 and n.24
(1978).
21 The video operator also would be guilty of a child pornography offense-
distributing.
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B. Limited Privacy Loss
If police discretion is handled fairly and wisely, then presum-
ably any extra enforcement power incident to the possession
crime will not act to intrude on legitimate privacy expectations.
If they instead choose to investigate more thoroughly than a
healthy respect for privacy would dictate I still do not think that
the intrusion on privacy will be any different because they in-
vestigate a possession as compared to, for example, a use-to-
entice crime. If the police go too far under the fourth amend-
ment, the courts always are available as a check. As with law
enforcement benefits so too is the conclusion regarding privacy
intrusion. In each instance the relatively few cases investigated
and prosecuted combined with the number of crimes already
available to convict the possessor lead to a conclusion that the
child pornography possession crime will have a negligible impact.
C. The Stanley Slippery Slope
What then of the fear that a child pornography exception
ultimately means the end of Stanley9 Are children sui generis,
or does a crime of child pornography possession augur a new
trend of examining what people read and think in the privacy
of their own homes?
The available research relied on by the Stanley Court to
conclude that obscemty is not likely to injure either participant
or viewer today is both seriously questioned in terms of meth-
odology and contradicted by later studies. 8 Several experts now
report a connection between viewing violent obscenity and com-
mitting violence on women.239 Although no equivalent data exists
that harm is caused to an adult pornography participant merely
from knowledge of the existence of the obscenity, I would not
be surprised to see that data develop.
I do not know how farfetched the progression from child
pornography back to a re-evaluation of Stanley would strike the
238 See, e.g., Wilson, Violence, Pornography, and Social Science, 233-38 in THE
PORNORAHY CoNrmovaisy (1975) (R. Rist, ed.).
"I A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 323-29. See generally PoRNOGRAPHY
" SxuA. Aca.sslioN (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984).
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Court. So long as the distinction for child pornography primarily
or completely rests on the harm caused to a child participant as
compared to a consenting adult obscemty participant, child por-
nography is sufficiently distinguishable to fall well outside Stan-
ley In fact, I believe child pornography is distinguishable on
the basis of harm even if the Court were to declare obscemty
protected speech tomorrow Exceptions specific to children
abound in the caselaw in the first amendment area2 ° and else-
where.24 ' This simply would be one more.
More troublesome in terms of the Ferber holding is how one
distinguishes the harm to a child from possessing child pornog-
raphy as compared, for example, to the harm caused from
possessing a nude picture of a child2 42 If under Ferber a state
legitimately may protect children from harm, then arguably the
Court must define as child abuse any depiction that causes harm
to a child.
It is not particularly difficult to make a reasonable guess at
what the Ferber Court has in mind when it noted that not all
child nudity would be child pornography If the child pornog-
raphy is not obscene under Miller, a determination of crimnnality
likely depends on the interrelationship of four somewhat over-
lapping factors.
The first factor is the nature of the activity depicted. A
picture of a nude child, absent seductive pose, is different from
the same nude child posed seductively and certainly different
from a depiction of that nude child engaged in sexual activity
The second factor is the projected impact of the activity on
the child pornography participant. The child may suffer embar-
rassment or shame in posing nude, particularly if in a seductive
pose. He or she may be unhappy and nervous during the photo
or film session. Not only is that embarrassment surely magnified
if the child is photographed while engaged in performing a sexual
act with another, but the sexual activity is an additional harm.
See cases cited supra note 13-17.
E.g., In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (difference in procedural rights between
adults and juveniles).
2A2 The Ferber Court noted that not all portrayals of child sexuality would be
unprotected speech. Id. at 764. Cf. Shields v. Gross, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254, 448 N.E.2d 108
(1982) (photos taken with parental consent could not later be challenged by child).
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The third factor is the societal evaluation of the legitimacy
of the purpose for the picture. A nude picture of Ida Innocent
in a medical text might pass muster under Ferber when that
same photograph rmght be child pornography if published in a
sex magazine. 24s Presumably Ida's embarrassment about posing
nude would be present no matter what the purpose for the
depiction (although perhaps not to the same degree). Presumably
that embarrassment will continue through her knowledge that
others have and will see her nude picture. Nonetheless, since
society will consider the context of the publication in deciding
whether Ida's character is impugned, the defimtional decision as
to whether it is child pornography partly will ride on the same
criterion.
The need for the depiction is the fourth factor. As with
purpose, need makes a difference. Suppose the medical text
contained a picture of Ida engaged in sexual intercourse. Here
not only is the harm to Ida significantly greater but it is far
more difficult to justify the need for the depiction. The medical
text could always depict adults or, if size is important, small
adults or line drawings.
Need, purpose, nature of the activity depicted, and impact
of the activity on a child will add up to a judgment whether or
not harm exists. Although perhaps ultimately circular, need,
purpose, nature of the activity depicted, and impact of the
activity on a child also may add up to a judgment whether or
not the depiction is child pornography
Now apply this standard for identifying child pornography
Suppose that the picture at issue in Ferber-2 -boys masturbat-
"4 Cf. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Ginzberg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966) (in close cases defendant's treatment of material in emphasizing "pro-
vocative aspects" will control court's obscenity characterization). Perhaps a general
circulation "family" newspaper by definition can never publish child pornography. I
feel that perhaps a major motion picture company can also never be said to produce
obscenity. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (motion picture which did not
"depict sexual conduct in patently offensive way" was not obscene).
24 I am dealing here with whether the newspaper may be prosecuted for dissemi-
nation of the picture (or even sued in tort for invasion of privacy). I do not address the
additional, and much harder, question whether the newspaper may be prevented from
publishing the picture initially. E.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
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ing-was run by a daily newspaper or popular news magazine
as a graphic illustration of the evils of child pornography 245
Ferber's own distribution of the picture is a crime. What differ-
ence should/does apply when the disseminator is a general cir-
culation newspaper 9
Under a Miller obscenity test the newspaper publication is
not obscene because a legitimate societal purpose in the publi-
cation existed, and, taken as a whole, it does not appeal to a
prurient interest. 246 And by contrast to Ferber's activities, the
newspaper's purpose in publishing is to eliminate child pornog-
raphy by graphic illustration of the need for vigorous law en-
forcement. Thus, unlike Ferber, publication is not an
encouragement to the commercial production of child pornog-
raphy
The harm to the boys derived from the participation in the
sexual activity, however, is at least a constant and probably
substantially more severe because the general public, not just
the pedophilic underworld, sees the picture. 247 At the same time,
(1975) (allowed publication of rape victim's name based on court records).
Further, even if the newspaper publication would be child pornography, the news-
paper could still harm the child-and yet be protected under Ferber simply by naming
the child and explicitly describing the sex act in which the child participated. Thus a
focus on harm to the child is a somewhat unsatisfying solution.
" Or the picture might have appeared in a medical journal. Or the picture may
have appeared to be the two boys but actually was a simulation using adult performers.
Or an identical picture of native boys might have been published in National Geographic
as evidence of a tribal ritual. This latter example raises the potential overbreadth
argument that arises when foreign children are considered within the scope of a state
possession offense. In their cultures some of this activity may be condoned if not
prescribed. I still believe that the statutes are constitutional without regard to proof of
nexus between the child depicted and the state prosecuting. See supra text accompanying
notes 151-63.
1 See supra note 6 for the complete Miller test.
147 See People v. Spargo, 431 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982):
We believe that children who have already been the subject of graphic
sexual depiction in some form of child pornography have an interest in
having such matenal shielded from the view of others. As damaging as the
initial sexual exploitation involved when the photographs were taken is the
continuing fear of exposure from distribution and the possible tension of
keeping the act secret. Exhibition of the photographs in the case at bar,
for example, could very well lead to further contact and exploitation of
the child since the children's names and sexual traits were contained in
[the trial record].
Id. at 31.
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showing need for the depiction is difficult. The newspaper, after
all, could run the picture and cover the child's face to prevent
identification.
Is the newspaper publication child pornography under Fer-
ber9 The possible answer to this question is troubling since, if
harm to the child controls, I suspect that under the Ferber
reasoning constitutional prosecution is possible. Even more trou-
bling than what happens to the newspaper publisher is what
theoretically SHOULD happen to the at-home possessor of the
newspaper. If the newspaper is child pornography, then the at-
home reader is in possession of child pornography Although I
have no doubt that the at-home reader would not be prosecuted,
I have some difficulty describing a principled distinction that
exempts him.
24 8
Of some comfort, however, is the belief that the Court never
will face these questions because no responsible newspaper pub-
lisher would choose to publish such a picture, at least where a
child could be identified. It is a sufficient answer therefore to
say, as the Ferber Court clearly did, that the hard questions
such as the one posed by this example will be faced only if and
when they arise (with the implicit assumption that they never
will arise). I do not know As I am not sure that I know what
the answers should be.
VIII. SHOULD WE? OR SHOULDN'T WE? HESITANT FINAL
THOUGHTS
I believe that a pedophile uses child pornography to entice
victims. I believe that prosecution for possession of child por-
nography will sometimes catch a pedophile against whom an
abuse case would fail. I believe that child pornography in its
own right, and without regard to the harm caused by the activity
depicted, injures children (but I do not have any notion as to
how much nor do I know whether less injury would be caused
if societal attitudes changed tomorrow). I believe that child
14 One possible distinction is that the at-home newspaper reader-at least if the
newspaper is delivered to the subscriber's door-is not in knowing possession. Cf.
Lamber v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (no notice); Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d 427
(Ala. Ct. App. 1944) (no actus reus).
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pornography is related to child sex abuse, and I certainly believe
a child is harmed from early initiation to sex-particularly in
the circumstances that frequently prevail when production of
child pornography is concerned.
When resolution of the issue comes down to balancing what
looks like a child pornography possessor's minimal loss of pri-
vacy against what looks like a minimal increase in law enforce-
ment ability to protect children from harm caused by predator
adults, the answer I come to is to make at-home possession a
crime. 2 9 The privacy interest by itself, even if substantial, simply
does not override a finding of real harm to children whose
incidence and impact could be lessened even a little by a child
pornography possession crime.
I am not attempting to denigrate privacy concerns. I simply
think that, since "to take child pornography more seriously is
to take sexual abuse of children more seriously, and vice versa,'" s0
prevention of harm to children is a more compelling interest
here. I expect most legislatures to decide similarly Regard-
ing the crime of at-home possession of child pornography, I
suspect that what is obvious to laypeople is a problem only for
lawyers.
"I A lot of us seemingly are in the same boat. The American Civil Liberties Union,
for example, argues that when harm to children is shown, society should act to prevent
that harm. Interestingly, it finesses the question of just what shows harm.
110 A.G. Pornography Report, supra note 3, at 417.
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